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ABSTRACT—The model of discrimination animating some of the most 
common approaches to detecting discrimination in both law and social 
science—the counterfactual causal model—is wrong. In that model, racial 
discrimination is detected by measuring the “treatment effect of race,” where 
the treatment is conceptualized as manipulating the raced status of otherwise 
identical units (e.g., a person, a neighborhood, a school). Most objections to 
talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual model have been raised in 
terms of manipulability. If we cannot manipulate a person’s race at the 
moment of a police stop, traffic encounter, or prosecutorial charging 
decision, then it is impossible to detect if the person’s race was the sole cause 
of an unfavorable outcome. But this debate has proceeded on the wrong 
terms. The counterfactual causal model of discrimination is not wrong 
because we can’t work around the practical limits of manipulation, as 
evidenced by both Eddie Murphy’s comic genius in the Saturday Night Live 
skit “White Like Me” and the entire genre of audit and correspondence 
studies. It is wrong because to fit the rigor of the counterfactual model of a 
clearly defined treatment on otherwise identical units, we must reduce race 
to only the signs of the category, meaning we must think race is skin color, 
or phenotype, or other ways we identify group status. And that is a concept 
mistake if one subscribes to a constructivist, as opposed to a biological or 
genetic, conception of race. The counterfactual causal model of 
discrimination is based on a flawed theory of what the category of race 
references, how it produces effects in the world, and what is meant when we 
say it is wrong to make decisions of import because of race. I argue that 
DISCRIMINATION is a thick ethical concept that at once describes and 
evaluates the actions to which it is applied, and therefore, we cannot detect 
actions as discriminatory by identifying a relation of counterfactual 
causality; we can do so only by reasoning about the action’s distinctive 
wrongfulness by referencing what constitutes the very categories that are the 
objects of concern. An adequate theory of discrimination must rest upon (1) 
an account of the system of social meanings or practices that constitute the 
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categories at issue and (2) a moral theory of what is fair and just in various 
state and private arenas given what the categories are. 
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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING AND DETECTING DISCRIMINATION 
Judge Schroeder did not believe Dr. Lamberth could pick out Hispanic 
drivers by looking at them.1 
To be more specific, Judge Schroeder did not find the method Dr. 
Lamberth employed to create a “benchmark” of the objective rate at which 
Hispanic drivers violated traffic laws in North Carolina’s Alamance County 
to be scientific. 
To be even more specific, Judge Schroeder did not believe that Dr. 
Lamberth had deployed an objective, replicable, or verifiable method to 
detect the rate at which Hispanic drivers violated North Carolina traffic laws 
by hiring two auditors, Mr. Rivera and Mr. Valdez, to sit in parked cars on 
select roadways, observe passing cars, count which were violating North 
Carolina traffic laws, and look at drivers to see “who ‘appeared to be’ or 
‘looked’ Hispanic.”2 
Judge Schroeder noted that other cases and other peer-reviewed studies 
relied upon a similar observational methodology to construct a benchmark 
of the rate at which a designated demographic group violated certain laws. 
However, he pointed out that those studies “utilized more reliable methods 
of observation,” and were comparing “African-American drivers, not 
Hispanic drivers, to non-African-American drivers,” which, his reasoning 
implied, presented obvious and unproblematic indicia of racial status.3 Judge 
Schroeder concluded that because “no control, standard, or description was 
used to identify Hispanics[,] . . . Dr. Lamberth offered no information on 
what, if any, standard [the auditors] used,” and “Dr. Lamberth’s study thus 
relies entirely on the subjective views of Rivera and Valdez and their 
 
 1 United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 331 (M.D.N.C. 2015). Debates about the visual 
obviousness of racial and ethnic categories is a longstanding tradition in American law. See, for example, 
the fascinating discussion of the racial status of Hindus in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 
204 (1923), in Sherally Munshi, “You Will See My Family Became So American”: Toward a Minor 
Comparativism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 655, 656 (2015), or the discussion of the adjudication of the 
obviousness of Alice Jones’s blackness in Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring 
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 2393, 2399 (2007). 
 2 Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 305. 
 3 Id. at 332. 
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personal, totally subjective say-so of who should be considered ‘Hispanic.’”4 
Judge Schroeder, therefore, excluded Dr. Lamberth’s expert report and 
testimony as failing to meet the Daubert standards for admissibility, 
including testability, known error rates, peer review, and general acceptance 
in the scientific community.5 
Based on his conclusion that this and another study could not prove 
discrimination, Judge Schroeder ruled in 2015 that the United States 
Department of Justice failed in its more-than-three-year effort to show that 
the Alamance County Sheriff engaged in “a pattern or practice of 
discriminatory law enforcement activities directed against Latinos in 
Alamance County” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.6 
How do we know when a particular act, practice, or policy is an instance 
of DISCRIMINATION?7 What precisely do we mean when we identify 
discrimination as an act, practice, or policy taken “because of” race or 
ethnicity? This Article will probe these questions in one arena of social life 
in which this author just happens to have experience and interest—police and 
prosecutorial racial discrimination. The conceptual analysis offered here is 
applicable to other arenas of social life—from employment, to housing, to 
credit—and has modified implications for how to conceptualize other 
categories of discrimination—from sex to sexual orientation. However, I will 
stick to the example of race or ethnicity in criminal justice simply to focus 
the discussion and because these debates have immediate political salience 
as recent killings of unarmed black persons have pushed the question of 
 
 4 Id. at 331. 
 5 This is the court’s “gatekeeping” function under FED. R. EVID. 702, and Daubert requires “that any 
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 6 Complaint at 1, Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272 (No. 1:12-cv-01349-TDS-JLW); see also Johnson, 
122 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (concluding that the United States Department of Justice did not meet its burden 
of demonstrating that the Alamance County Sherriff’s Office engaged in discriminatory law enforcement 
practices). 
 In 2012, the Department of Justice had filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, alleging that the Alamance 
County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO), headed by Terry S. Johnson, 
disproportionately subjects Hispanics to unreasonable searches, arrests them for minor infractions 
(in lieu of issuing warnings or citations), targets them at vehicle checkpoints located in 
predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods, uses ethically-offensive epithets to refer to Hispanics and 
otherwise tolerates activities of deputies that evidence anti-Hispanic bias, automatically and 
selectively refers Hispanic arrestees to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
investigators for deportation, and otherwise engages in deficient policies, training, and oversight 
that facilitates discriminatory enforcement. 
Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 282. 
 7 I use small caps for concepts (the concept DISCRIMINATION in noun form or DISCRIMINATORY in 
adjectival form); scare quotes for terms of art, expressions, or to indicate so-called usage; and italics for 
emphasis.  
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discriminatory police violence into mainstream public debates. So how do 
we detect discrimination when questions of great importance hang in the 
balance? 
A. Discrimination as Outcomes Caused by Race 
This Article argues that animating the most common approaches to 
detecting discrimination in both law and social science is a model of 
discrimination that is, well, wrong. I term this model the “counterfactual 
causal model” of race discrimination. Discrimination, on this account, is 
detected by measuring the “treatment effect of race,” where treatment is 
conceptualized as manipulating the raced status of otherwise identical units 
(e.g., a person, a neighborhood, a school).8 Discrimination is present when 
an adverse outcome occurs in the world in which a unit is “treated” by being 
raced—for example, black—and not in the world in which the otherwise 
identical unit is “treated” by being, for example, raced white.9 The 
counterfactual model has the allure of precision and the security of 
seemingly obvious divisions or natural facts.10 Despite notable objections, 
 
 8 I will use the awkward terminology of “unit” throughout the Article, unless I am giving an example 
of particular types of units, in order to indicate that the model (and my objections to it) can encompass 
individual and aggregate units of analysis. The treatment would differ based on the type of unit. For 
example, we might imagine the individual-level treatment to be discrete raced status (e.g., white vs. 
black), and the treatment for aggregate-level units might be a continuous measurement (e.g., population 
composition measure). Although there are important differences between individual-level and aggregate-
level units in terms of expressing the counterfactual model and the types of objections one could raise to 
the model as a conceptualization of discrimination, this Article is mostly dedicated to laying out the broad 
strokes of my objections. 
 9 Levi Martin and King-To Yeung launch their exploration of the use of the category of race in 
sociology over sixty years with the following parable: 
There is an old Zen koan in which the master Shuzan Osho held up his staff before his disciples 
and said, “You monks! If you call this a staff, you oppose its reality. If you do not call it a staff, 
you ignore the fact. Tell me, you monks, what will you call it?” The discomfort felt by the monks, 
who had to choose between denying their insight into the fundamental oneness of the universe 
and making the absurd counterfactual denial of self-evident fact, is also felt by many sociologists 
when it comes to the analysis of race. 
John Levi Martin & King-To Yeung, The Use of the Conceptual Category of Race in American Sociology, 
1937–99, 18 SOC. F. 521, 521 (2003). In a rare moment of commonality with monks, I am similarly 
tortured to find terminology that at once acknowledges the socially constructed nature of race but also 
recognizes that in its current constructed form, it presents as a solid, obvious, and commonsensical 
“category of practice.” Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 
1, 4 (2000). Like the monks, I have not found an answer to how to acknowledge the taken-for-granted 
status of race and also its contingent, constructed, and contested meaning and content. So, I will waver 
back and forth, probably frustrating everyone with my terminology, sometimes using race 
unproblematically when I am talking about the counterfactual model, and sometimes using awkward 
terms like “raced status” to indicate a black box of ascriptive meaning. 
 10 Osagie Obasogie calls the current hegemonic understanding “race” ipsa loquitur: “[the] notion 
that race is not only visually obvious but that its social salience, perceptibility, and visual significance 
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this remains the leading conception of discrimination in both law and social 
science.11 But I contend that this model is wrong. It is wrong because it is 
based on a flawed theory of (1) what the concept RACE references and how 
it produces effects in the world, and (2) what we mean when we say it is bad 
to make important decisions “because of race.” 
Much of this Article is dedicated to making the negative case against 
the predominant counterfactual causal model of discrimination by arguing 
that it is incompatible with the constructivist theory of race, to which most 
(but not all) academics and judges say they subscribe.12 In the process, I 
propose a radically different way of conceptualizing discrimination that uses 
two concepts largely unfamiliar in debates about discrimination. Although 
these concepts might at first blush seem challenging, I contend that they are 
essential to any plausible approach to discrimination. 
Objections to talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual 
framework are usually raised in terms of manipulability. Candidates for 
causes in the counterfactual framework are limited to viable treatments to 
which a unit could be subjected at the time the outcome of interest might 
occur.13 If one cannot manipulate a person’s race at the moment of a police 
stop, traffic encounter, or prosecutorial charging decision, then it is 
impossible to detect if the person’s race was the sole cause of an unfavorable 
outcome. But, as many have pointed out, we should not confuse empirical 
and theoretical objections. If one accepts that race or ethnicity is the type of 
thing that is properly conceptualized as an isolated manipulation on units that 
can otherwise remain the same units, then there are workarounds to the 
practical problems of actual manipulation. We can, for example, imagine 
presenting a police officer or prosecutorial decision-maker with candidates 
for an outcome bearing identical credentials and vary some indicia of the 
candidate’s racial status in order to detect the treatment effect of race. This 
is the logic of what are called audit studies––a method illustrated brilliantly 
 
stem from self-evident distinctions . . . .” OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE 
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND 143–44 (2014). 
 11 See infra Parts I–II. 
 12 And if one is not a constructivist about race, then I don’t see any way one can recognize 
discrimination as a wrong distinctive from, say, general distributive injustice or inefficiency. See infra 
text accompanying notes 16–20. 
 13 Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 959 (1986). 
An attribute cannot be a cause in an experiment, because the notion of potential exposability does 
not apply to it. The only way for an attribute to change its value is for the unit to change in some 
way and no longer be the same unit. Statements of ‘causation’ that involve attributes as ‘causes’ 
are always statements of association between the values of an attribute and a response variable 
across the units in a population. 
Id. at 955. 
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by Eddie Murphy in the 1984 Saturday Night Live skit “White Like Me,” 
where he applies white face makeup to see how he is treated as a white man 
in New York City.14 But my concerns with conceptualizing race as a 
treatment as a way to define discrimination are theoretical, not practical. 
The problem with identifying discrimination with the treatment effect 
of race is that it misrepresents what race is and how it produces effects in the 
world, and concomitantly, what makes discrimination because of race a 
moral wrong. In the classic counterfactual causal inference framework, race 
can be a treatment on units only if manipulating it does not entail 
fundamental changes to other aspects of the unit. Thus, audit studies can be 
interpreted as detecting the treatment effect of race and race alone by 
changing some signifier of racial status on candidates only if the 
manipulation does not transform the unit into a different unit in ways 
necessarily relevant to interpreting an action as discriminatory.15 But if the 
signifiers of racial categories fundamentally structure the interpretation and 
relevance of other characteristics or traits of the unit, then it is a mistake to 
talk about identical units that differ only by raced status. Yet, to talk about 
race as an isolated treatment on units reduces it to some set of signifiers that 
elicits outcomes in the world only as a psychological trigger or stimulus to 
disfavor. And to do so is a gross category mistake, at least if you subscribe 
to the constructivist theory of race. 
A constructivist rejects the notion that racial categories in the United 
States are constituted by genetic or biological facts, and instead holds that 
what now seem like obvious, taken-for-granted categories of racial 
difference were constructed over hundreds of years of historical practices 
starting with chattel slavery and colonization. Categories such as 
“whiteness” and “blackness” were forged through social relations such as 
forced labor, colonization, immigration, and Jim Crow; they were contested 
and policed through many institutions including immigration laws, housing 
and education segregation, violent regulation of social and intimate relations, 
and hoarding of occupational and economic opportunity. These processes 
 
 14 The skit’s name was a play on the book by John Howard Griffin, a white journalist who took 
medication to darken his skin and recorded his experiences traveling in the 1950s Deep South. JOHN 
HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (2010). 
 15 “Signifier” and “signified” are terms from semiotics with contested meanings, but for purposes of 
this project a simple definition is sufficient. Without subscribing to all of Barthes’s semiotics, I will use 
those classic terms—signifier and signified—to roughly mean the forms, signals, and material of 
expression (the signifier) and the content expressed, concept referenced, or meaning imparted by the 
former (the signified). Signifiers come to signify particular concepts or values because of social, cultural, 
or historical convention, not because of some natural relationship between the form of the signifier and 
its signified. ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 39–42 (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 
1977). 
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made certain aspects of physical appearance salient markers of social 
difference and reinforced their relevance over many types of interactions. 
Just because we can trace the historical processes by which these categories 
were constructed does not make them any less real with real effects; a wink 
or hoodie can have fatal consequences because of the status of race. We 
continue to live in a world in which most important institutions are 
racialized, meaning they play an active role in reproducing the significance 
of these very categories. 
This—with extreme brevity—is what is commonly termed the social 
constructivist theory of race, which holds that the racial categories as we 
currently know them are not inevitable distinctions that naturally arise from 
objective biological differences, but instead are the product of contingent 
historical social processes.16 Thus, for a constructivist, the term “race” cannot 
refer to an attribute, a genetically produced trait, or a signifier—level of 
melanin in skin, phenotype, distinctive names or speech—that people just 
have and thereby obviously belong to a designated racial group. The term 
references a complexly constituted social fact, whereby material and 
dignitary opportunities are organized such that certain physical and cultural 
signifiers become the salient markers of consequential cultural categories, 
and those categories are constituted by a constellation of social relations and 
meanings with a definite content and organization.17 Race in America is, as 
Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi say, “a social system that uses skin color as the 
criterion for classification. . . . Racial stratification is real, but biology is not 
its root cause.”18 Although the constructivist view is now widely accepted in 
 
 16 There are numerous rich (and in some respects competing) frameworks that theorize the processes 
by which racial status or groups are constructed. Constructivist positions are articulated in so many places 
it is hard to cite to them, but a few well-known examples in sociology include the following: MUSTAFA 
EMIRBAYER & MATTHEW DESMOND, THE RACIAL ORDER 49 (2015); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD 
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 103–36 (3d ed. 2015); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The 
Essential Social Fact of Race, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 899, 899 (1999); and Mara Loveman, Is “Race” 
Essential?, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 891, 891 (1999). 
 17 The term “social fact” is drawn from Durkheim, for whom social facts “consist of manners of 
acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue 
of which they exercise control over him.” EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 
AND SELECTED TEXTS ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS METHOD 21 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 2d ed. 
2013). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva described race as “the essential social fact,” and I follow him in saying that 
defining race as an individual-level trait makes no sense because it fails to recognize that those traits only 
have meaning in particular racialized systems of material and symbolic hierarchies. See Bonilla-Silva, 
supra note 16, at 899. 
 18 Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Methods, 
in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 3, 10 (Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008). 
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academic circles, its implications are not appreciated by the predominant 
legal and social scientific approaches for detecting discrimination.19 
One implication of the social constructivist theory is that race cannot be 
conceptualized as an isolated treatment in the counterfactual causal model, 
and accordingly, racial discrimination cannot be defined as the treatment 
effect of race. If we accept the constructivist theory of race, then we must 
reject attempts to detect racial discrimination that seek to isolate the causal 
effect of race alone because it rests on a sociologically incoherent conception 
of what race references and how it can cause a distinctive form of action 
called discrimination. 
The first conceptual tool I use to proffer an alternative account of 
discrimination that is compatible with the constructivist theory of race is 
borrowed from moral philosopher Bernard Williams, who coined the phrase 
“thick ethical concept” for terms that simultaneously describe and evaluate 
the object to which they are applied.20 Thin ethical concepts, such as BAD, 
OUGHT, or RIGHT,  do not require “institutional and cultural presuppositions” 
in order to impart judgment.21 To apply the terms properly, you do not need 
access to complex social facts, and to say that an action is BAD or RIGHT does 
not convey more information about the evaluated action beyond the moral 
valuation. Thick ethical concepts, on the other hand, such as 
RESPECTABILITY, CHIVALRY, or PIETY, do require complex social 
knowledge in order to be used and decoded. To invoke the term is to 
simultaneously represent the evaluated action as a particular kind of action—
one that is only classifiable as such using a cultural repertoire and 
understandings about the functioning of a particular social world—and to 
impart judgment. That is, to morally evaluate an action with a thick ethical 
concept communicates information about the way in which the action is bad 
that relies on institutional and cultural facts.22 
Discrimination is not a thin ethical concept that can be represented as 
“choosing + bad,” “arresting + mean,” or “prosecuting + irrational,” because 
 
 19 ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF RACE: HOW SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT HUMAN 
DIFFERENCE 10–23 (2011) (showing that the constructivist view is widely accepted among social 
scientists, but the biological conception of race is still commonly held by undergraduates and the public 
at large); see also Martin & Yeung, supra note 9, at 521–25 (showing that although the constructivist 
position is explicitly embraced by social scientists, many fail to operationalize it in any meaningful way 
in their research methodology). 
 20 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 155–56 (2006). 
 21 Gabriel Abend, Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain, 52 EUR. J. SOC. 143, 147–48 (2011). One 
might need situated sociological knowledge to understand the subject of a sentence using thin moral 
concepts, such as “Polygamy is bad,” but the evaluative component is not entailed in the way in which 
the object is described. 
 22 Id. at 149–58. 
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we know that the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, Title IX, and countless 
other state and federal statutes are not about outlawing all bad, mean, or 
irrational forms of state or private action. Discrimination is a thick ethical 
concept that can only be comprehended with access to situated cultural 
knowledge about the relevant categories that make up a particular society’s 
system of stratification and a normative critique of how those categories 
operate. In order for something to be discriminatory—instead of merely 
mean, random, or irrational—the act or policy must rely on meanings or facts 
that constitute the social category in ways that we morally disavow. 
Therefore, any discrimination-detecting exercise must proceed from some 
moral theory—often implicit—of what is fair or just in the face of how a 
particular society’s stratification works through meanings and relations of its 
social types. 
This brings me to the second conceptual tool I use to build an alternative 
to the counterfactual causal model of discrimination, that of constitutive 
explanation, which I argue accurately captures the type of claim made when 
something is labeled discriminatory. A constitutive claim accounts for the 
capacities of complex systems by reference to their constitutive elements: 
the parts and organization that make the system what it is.23 To identify 
something as discrimination when it happened “because of” race or ethnicity 
is not to name a relation of counterfactual dependence defined as an outcome 
triggered by isolating and manipulating an individual trait. To identify 
something as discrimination when it happened because of race or ethnicity 
is to offer a constitutive claim that explains how an action or practice can be 
morally objectionable by virtue of the complex of social meanings and 
relations that constitute the social category. A constitutive claim unifies a set 
of disparate practices (choosing, excluding, promoting, demoting, arresting, 
jailing, beating, humiliating, killing) as morally problematic in the same way, 
namely by reference to how the action or policy engages the content of the 
socially constructed category. 
Combining these two conceptual components yields a definition of 
discrimination as an action or practice that acts on or reproduces an aspect 
of the category in a way that is morally objectionable. It is a thick ethical 
concept that—to express the distinctive wrongfulness of the action vis-à-vis 
the category—must rest upon an account of the system of social meanings 
or practices that constitute the categories at issue. 
The definition contains empirical and normative elements, both of 
which are black-boxed in this Article. The first black box must contain social 
ontology or practical anthropology, requiring us to identify and define the 
 
 23 See infra Part I. 
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stratifying social types in a given society; the second black box must contain 
political and moral philosophy, requiring us to decide what is fair and just in 
various state and private arenas given what the categories are. The point of 
this Article is not to fill in those black boxes, but to explain why both 
elements are fundamental to any discrimination-detecting endeavor. 
B. What to Expect and Why It Matters 
Before proceeding, let me be clear that my aim here is not to criticize 
quantitative methods, audit studies, or legal strategy from any case or 
research program. My aim is to make a set of sociological and analytic points 
concerning the meaning of those studies.24 My conceptual points lead to 
political–strategic ones. At the risk of being disowned by my materialist 
intellectual family, I will say that ideas matter. They especially matter in the 
legal field, where the way in which powerful legal actors conceptualize an 
issue has profound implications for what they do with their power. 
Currently, many courts, experts, and commentators approach detecting 
discrimination as an exercise measuring the counterfactual causal effect of 
race-qua-treatment, looking for complex methods to strip away confounding 
variables to get at a solid state of race and race alone.25 But what we are 
arguing about when we argue about whether or not statistical evidence 
provides proof of discrimination is precisely what we mean by the concept 
DISCRIMINATION. We are arguing about the social meaning of race and how 
it structures outcomes of interest. Similarly, what we are arguing about when 
we debate what variables ought to be controlled for or balanced on in a 
quantitative exercise to detect discrimination is what are the fair or just 
grounds for decision-making or resource allocation in light of what race is 
and how it operates. We ought to be clear about the nature of the debates we 
are having such that the driving issues are not obfuscated by claims of 
methodological rigor or objective scientism. 
Because thick ethical concepts and constitutive explanations are 
significantly less familiar ways of approaching discrimination than the 
counterfactual causal model, Part I offers a primer so that the reader may 
sense that there is an alternative way of thinking about this issue before I 
proceed to my negative case. Part II turns, briefly, to showing just how 
prevalent the counterfactual causal conceptualization is in both law and 
 
 24 Many people who use the terminology of causal effects of race or who interpret methods in a way 
that suggests race can be conceptualized as a treatment in the counterfactual model may embrace the 
constructivist account of race but use the language because it is expedient. I simply caution that “[w]hat 
we do may be more important than what we think and what we say.” Martin & Yeung, supra note 9, at 
539. 
 25 See infra Part II. 
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social science. To fully comprehend my critique of the model, it is essential 
to present it with formal rigor, and Part III does so. The first two Sections of 
Part III explore critiques of talking about race as a treatment in the 
counterfactual causal inference literature and lay out the most widely 
accepted retort that has been offered to support the counterfactual causal 
model of discrimination. The third Section of Part III fleshes out my 
sociological objection to race-qua-treatment by exploring how attempting to 
isolate the treatment effect of race is at odds with a constructivist account of 
race, which rejects the view that racial categories “reflect natural, stable 
differences between human groups.”26 
My arguments are pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction in Parts I 
through III, and therefore, Part IV explores the cash value of these theoretical 
points by thinking through the nitty-gritty of design and interpretation of 
audit or correspondence studies, which are usually touted as the gold 
standard for causal inference. In this Part, I argue that audit studies certainly 
can produce evidence of discrimination, but they don’t do so by virtue of 
isolating the treatment effect of race. Audit studies are often recognized as 
compelling evidence of discrimination because they instantiate widely 
shared moral convictions, namely that, at a minimum, persons in the 
designated social groups with the given set of credentials ought to elicit the 
same treatment. But, properly understood, audit studies produce evidence of 
discrimination in the same way that analysis of observational data or an 
individual encounter do: by relying on a constitutive claim about what race 
is to ground a moral claim about what is distinctively wrong about the act or 
practice. 
The final Part of this Article does not offer a new set of clean, 
determinate doctrinal formulations of discrimination, nor list magic-bullet 
methods to detect it. As will become clear, one of my main claims throughout 
this Article is that it is impossible to do so without a prior moral–political 
philosophy of what justice requires in private and public domains in light of 
what racial and ethnic stratification is in America today, a substantial project 
for a different paper (or book).27 However, I suggest that an upshot of the 
arguments I advance about the counterfactual causal model is that 
distinctions between disparate treatment and impact that have been advanced 
in terms of the former being caused exclusively by race and the latter being 
 
 26 MORNING, supra note 19, at 18. 
 27 For such eloquent theories and debates, see CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE COLOR OF OUR SHAME: 
RACE AND JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (2013); Tommie Shelby, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian 
Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697 (2004); Charles W. Mills, Retrieving Rawls for Racial 
Justice?: A Critique of Tommie Shelby, 1 CRITICAL PHIL. RACE 1 (2013); and CHARLES W. MILLS, 
BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL LIBERALISM (2017). 
113:1163 (2019) Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking 
1175 
caused by something that is not-race, but correlated with race, are not 
conceptually tenable distinctions.28 They are not tenable because these 
formulations only make sense if one defines race as the visual or social cues 
associated with the category: race is skin color, or is phenotype, or is one of 
the physical or social signifiers of the category. If one subscribes to the 
constructivist notion of race—in which signifiers come to be indicative of a 
status only through entrenched social practices—then it is nonsensical to talk 
about constitutive practices as somehow being race-neutral things. Of 
course, we can advance other distinctions between what should or should not 
be legally actionable discrimination, but we can’t do so by relying on value-
free notions of counterfactual causality. 
Many scholars have compellingly argued that the law of equal 
protection ought to be interpreted as a principle of antisubordination, or that 
the purpose of antidiscrimination law more broadly ought to be understood 
as a project of remaking social meanings of historically marginalized 
groups.29 I agree with their arguments. But I approach this debate from a new 
angle, backing out a theory of the category of race from the prevailing 
methods used to detect discrimination. I conclude that if one subscribes to 
the constructivist theory of the category of race, then it is incoherent to 
understand the legal proscription against discrimination as anything but a 
project to remake the very meanings of social categories (unless you don’t 
want to distinguish discrimination from mere irrationality or idiosyncrasy, 
but then you have a different problem—which is to explain why the state’s 
heavy coercive machinery should be concerned with some forms of 
classification and not others).30 
Insofar as we (and I use the first-person plural pronoun to indicate I 
understand this Article as a part of conversation with activists on this front) 
are interested in transforming the social structures that systematically 
 
 28 The same conceptual points could be used to query the distinction between what economists call 
taste-based and statistical discrimination. The classic distinction defines the former as a willingness to 
pay to associate with members of group A instead of B notwithstanding identical productive 
qualifications, and the latter as using membership in A or B as a proxy for other instrumentally rational 
capacities or qualifications. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOME MODELS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
LABOR MARKET (1971); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 13–18 (2d ed. 1971); 
Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659–61 (1972). 
My point is that the former is an instance of DISCRIMINATION only when social conditions—some 
systematic social and economic differences that produce the salience of A-ness in opposition to B-ness—
make the latter possible, systematic social and economic differences such that A-ness is available as a 
proxy for functionally relevant qualifications.  
 29 See infra Conclusion. 
 30 Some have argued that, as a descriptive matter, much of antidiscrimination law has devolved into 
merely a proscription against irrationality. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000). My point is to critique such conflation 
from basic logical, sociological, and philosophical principles. 
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oppress and disadvantage minority communities, we must be incredibly 
attentive to the way discourses about race and ethnicity circulate and settle 
in the halls of power. In presenting quantitative evidence to courts, it is a 
mistake to talk as if we have gotten at the true effect of race by modeling it 
as a counterfactual treatment. In fact, to do so cements an already 
predominant and problematic understanding about race in public and legal 
discourse: one that is distressingly dehistoricized and desocialized.31 
Discourses have effects. Folks in positions of power—namely judges 
considering discrimination cases—make important decisions because they 
understand words and concepts in a particular way. And we should train our 
sights on trying to make them understand things in what, I contend, is the 
right way. Doing so will bring to the fore difficult political and moral 
judgments that are at the heart of debates about discrimination broadly. 
At a minimum, I hope to start a dialogue with the community that 
provides evidentiary expert statistical services to litigants in discrimination 
cases about how that material is consumed and given meaning in courts. 
Social scientists can do more in the fight against discrimination than provide 
technical skills; they can also offer careful reflexive thinking that rejects folk, 
commonsense-sounding concepts of race. We must be vigilant to “uncover 
the hidden assumptions in [our] own scientific unconscious . . . .”32 
I. PRIMER: THICK ETHICAL CONCEPTS AND 
CONSTITUTIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Discrimination is, to borrow from Bernard Williams, a “thick ethical 
concept” that simultaneously describes and evaluates the object to which it 
is applied.33 To know if something is DISCRIMINATION, one needs thick 
sociological and anthropological knowledge about what constitutes the 
 
 31 Others have raised objections to talking about race as a variable that causes other variables, 
highlighting that the practice is complicit (or active) in reifying race as an essential trait. See, e.g., TUKUFU 
ZUBERI, THICKER THAN BLOOD: HOW RACIAL STATISTICS LIE 29–31 (2001); Philip Goodman, Race in 
California’s Prison Fire Camps for Men: Prison Politics, Space, and the Racialization of Everyday Life, 
120 AM. J. SOC. 352 (2014); Tukufu Zuberi, Deracializing Social Statistics: Problems in the 
Quantification of Race, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172 (2000). I draw on these objections 
in Parts III and IV. 
 32 EMIRBAYER & DESMOND, supra note 16, at 72. 
 33 WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 155–56 (“Many exotic examples of these can be drawn from other 
cultures, but there are enough left in our own: coward, lie, brutality, gratitude, and so forth. They are 
characteristically related to reasons for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides 
someone with a reason for action, though that reason need not be a decisive one and may be outweighed 
by other reasons, as we saw with their role in practical reasoning in Chapter 1. Of course, exactly what 
reason for action is provided, and to whom, depends on the situation, in ways that may well be governed 
by this and by other ethical concepts, but some general connection with action is clear enough. We may 
say, summarily, that such concepts are ‘action-guiding.’”). 
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categories to which it is applied: how certain practices, acts, and 
understandings differentiate humans into distinct social kinds known as 
RACES or ETHNICITIES, and, conversely, how such constituted categories 
give meaning to acts and credentials. One also needs a normative theory 
about the fair and just basis for making decisions, which can be advanced 
only in light of the sociological or anthropological facts that make race or 
ethnicity a meaningful category whereby it is discriminatory—as opposed to 
just irrational or idiosyncratic—to act on it. Said another way, unless we have 
a moral critique of how such categories operate, we have no grounds to 
identify acts or practices as discriminatory.34 How should we think about 
detecting such a thick ethical concept? 
In my view, the only plausible account of what we are doing when we 
set out to detect discrimination is seeking “constitutive explanations,” which 
in turn ground thick ethical claims. Constitutive explanations explain 
properties of a system “by appealing to their parts and their organization.”35 
For example, one might say that a wine glass broke in response to the strike 
of a spoon because it was fragile.36 The explanation references what 
constitutes fragility by “detail[ing] the relevant aspects of the object’s 
molecular structure that make it fragile,” and by so doing, we understand 
why, under “certain enabling and triggering conditions,” the object breaks.37 
Or to say that the salt dissolved in water because it is water-soluble is to offer 
an explanation that references what constitutes salt––namely sodium and 
 
 34 If one is just enforcing accepted roles, then an act cannot be said to be discriminatory, as, for 
example, in the case of a parent–child relationship. There must be a critique of the reproduction of the 
status to identify something as discriminatory vis-à-vis that status. If, for example, an employer says a 
woman is being dismissed not because she is pregnant but because she needs physical accommodations 
to perform her job, that act can be identified as pregnancy discrimination only by referencing what 
pregnancy consists of (the physical changes entailed in the condition) and by relying on a moral theory 
designating what’s fair given what pregnancy is. 
 35 Petri Ylikoski, Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared, 78 ERKENNTNIS 277, 277–78 
(2013). Robert Cummins calls the search for constitutive explanation “property theories,” which seek to 
“explain the properties of a system not in the sense in which this means ‘Why did S acquire P?’ or ‘What 
caused S to acquire P? but, rather, ‘What is it for S to instantiate P?’, or, ‘In virtue of what does S have 
P?’” ROBERT CUMMINS, THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 14–15 (1983) (emphasis 
added). Cummins goes on to give the example of the kinetic theory of heat as a property theory because 
“it explains temperature in a gas by explaining how temperature is instantiated in a gas; it does not, by 
itself, explain changes in temperature.” Id. 
 36 A constitutive explanation states a relation of dependence (on the property of fragility) that holds 
constant the triggering conditions (the spoon strike) just like a counterfactual causal explanation—e.g., 
“the glass broke because it was struck by the spoon”—holds constant the constitutive properties of the 
glass (its fragility) and imagines varying the triggering condition (strike vs. no strike of the spoon). 
 37 This example is taken from Ylikoski, supra note 35, at 278–80; see also NANCY CARTWRIGHT, 
HUNTING CAUSES AND USING THEM: APPROACHES IN PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 14–23 (2007) 
(discussing the causal capacities of complex nonmodular systems like a carburetor that can be understood 
only by reference to the system’s overall geometry and structure of its component parts). 
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chloride atoms combined in an ionic bond––to make sense of a dispositional 
property of the substance when met with a different substance that consists 
of one atom of oxygen bound to two hydrogen atoms with covalent bonds.38 
To ask if something happened “because of race” similarly calls for a 
constitutive explanation, one that references the complex system of social 
meanings and relations that make up the very category.39 To say, for 
example, “I was not given a traffic ticket when I was pulled over for speeding 
because I am white” is to offer a constitutive explanation that references what 
constitutes WHITENESS—namely, a social type entailing a presumption of 
noncriminality and deservedness of leniency and respect. If I further contend 
that it was racially discriminatory that I was not given a ticket, then I am 
invoking a thick moral claim that is only intelligible if one understands what 
whiteness consists of. I am saying that the act ought to be condemned 
because of the manner in which it relies upon meanings or perpetuates 
understandings that make out the social kind WHITE. 
Constitutive explanations proffer counterfactual dependence: to say 
that a given system has a particular causal capacity or dispositional 
properties because of how it is constituted means that if you changed the 
parts and organization of the system, it would have different causal capacities 
or dispositional properties. But it would also be a different system; the 
category doing the causing would be a different category, just as two 
different allotropes are constituted by different structural arrangements and 
bonds of the same atoms. Diamond and graphite are both allotropes of the 
same atom, but because of the different structural arrangements and bonds 
(i.e., what constitutes them) they are different substances, which, in turn, 
display different dispositional chemical and physical properties. 
That is the heart of the difference between counterfactual causal claims 
and constitutive causal claims: counterfactual causal claims track an 
etiological dependence, whereas constitutive causal claims track the 
 
 38 As Cummins puts it: “To explain a dispositional regularity, then, we must explain how or why 
manifestations of the disposition are brought about given the requisite precipitating conditions.” 
CUMMINS, supra note 35, at 19. Much of natural science is about offering constitutive explanations. See, 
e.g., CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF 
NEUROSCIENCE 107–12 (2007). 
 39 Or consider the analogy to witchcraft offered by Karen Fields and Barbara Fields in their brilliant 
book Racecraft: “Witchcraft . . . acquires perfectly adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the 
reality of the imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined thing. . . . In Luther’s day, 
learned jurists and ecclesiastics produced mountains of such evidence.” KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. 
FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 22 (2012). In an enchanted world 
where witches are feared entities, the sentence “She was killed because she was a witch” calls forth a 
constitutive explanation about the social kind “witch,” one that refers to the content and structure of a 
system of religious beliefs and cultural understandings that made it possible to apprehend such a thing as 
“witch” and how those constitutive elements entail fear and violent rejection of that kind. 
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dependence of capacities of systems to the precise “properties of parts and/or 
their organization,” which make the system what it is.40 The proposition “If 
I had been black, I would have gotten a ticket” is really just another way of 
saying the social type BLACK is treated P-way in X encounters and the social 
type WHITE is treated G-way in X encounters. The proffered counterfactual 
does not get us to the discriminatory label without a moral theory that social 
types BLACK and WHITE both ought to be treated G-way (or P-way) in X 
encounters. But note that such a moral theory can only be advanced in light 
of what it is to have stratified racial social types BLACK and WHITE; we can 
only pick out acts that ought to be condemned in the specific way the label 
“racially discriminatory” condemns if we know which of the meanings, 
practices, and relations that constitute social kinds by race we want to 
disavow. And that, I take it, is the very point of the antidiscrimination 
project: to transform the social meaning of social categories that have—for 
so long, in so many domains—been infused with disfavor and disadvantage. 
Defining discrimination as a thick ethical concept whose detection 
demands an explanation of constitutive dependence—namely, analyzing 
how the distinctive wrongfulness of the action or practice is dependent upon 
what the category of race consists of—as opposed to identifying a value-
neutral fact of counterfactual dependence—namely, determining if the 
person’s (or unit’s) racial trait had been different, but nothing else, whether 
the action would have taken place—is a major conceptual shift. It requires 
abandoning common ways of talking about race as an attribute or trait and 
revising the hegemonic way causality is invoked to identify discrimination. 
Before the reader despairs that I am offering a much too complicated and 
fussy conceptual apparatus to deal with a fairly obvious set of questions, let 
me suggest that the possibility of thinking of race as an isolated unit attribute 
that can be manipulated without diffusing the very meaning of the unit for 
purposes of detecting discrimination is only possible because of our own 
“prenotions” about the category from living in a deeply racialized society.41 
If we properly understand the category, then it is impossible to think of it in 
terms of an isolated treatment. 
Sometimes a fantastical analogy shakes away the blinders of our own 
taken-for-granted categories. Consider an island society where the categories 
of social stratification are binary: Royal and non-Royal. The privileged class, 
Royal, wears purple capes and carries sticks. Their cultural tastes define what 
 
 40 Ylikoski, supra note 35, at 290. To be system S1 is to have parts and organization P-O1 and to be 
system S2 is to have parts and organization P-O2 and so on and so forth. 
 41 See DURKHEIM, supra note 17, at 39–46; EMIRBAYER & DESMOND, supra note 16, at 31–33, 49 
(calling for a “rigorous and methodological delineation of the problem at hand, rather than an uncritical 
acceptance of definitions already provided by folk wisdom and/or academic culture”). 
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is deemed high and valuable in this society, they occupy more prestigious 
occupations on the island, hoard more resources, etc.—you get the idea. To 
say that Royal is a social construct means that Royal is not merely the 
attribute of wearing purple capes and carrying sticks. Royal is a cultural 
category of thought and action constituted by a complex set of social 
relations and meanings that interactionally give import to indices of the 
category, such that the stick becomes a royal scepter and the cape becomes 
a sacred robe. 
A visiting anthropologist observes that in this society non-Royals step 
off the sidewalk when Royals are walking on the sidewalk. In order to 
properly characterize that action in a thick way—as non-Royal debasement 
(or, conversely, respectful Royal obedience)—she would need to first 
understand how the categories Royal and non-Royal are constituted in this 
society by analyzing social relations and cultural meanings. If she were to 
characterize the action as spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space 
or the expression of idiosyncratic sidewalk-versus-road personal 
preferences, she would misunderstand the meaning of the action in the 
culture. The visiting anthropologist would have no way of making sense of 
the fact that people with certain attributes (lacking capes and sticks) 
consistently step off the sidewalk when people with other attributes (capes 
and sticks) approach, or, more importantly, of making sense of why the 
former are consistently disadvantaged in other arenas of social and economic 
life. Nor would she be able to make sense of the moral dimension to the 
debate in the island’s political body over a bill requiring that all people walk 
on the sidewalk all of the time, especially when other laws on the island 
defend the right to express personal preferences in the market or intimate 
affairs, and when the culture generally applauds solving coordination 
problems without government direction. 
The visiting anthropologist could not classify the sidewalk action as 
non-Royal debasement simply by asking, “If I changed an isolated trait about 
a person (cape, stick) and nothing else changed about that person, would 
other pedestrians have remained on the sidewalk?” A lot of things change if 
she makes that manipulation in this society: namely, people no longer 
perceive a Royal to be walking down the sidewalk! It is only possible for 
those in the culture to react to the category of Royal because they recognize 
the indices of Royal to mean something significant beyond the holding of a 
stick or wearing of a cape. The way those meanings are embodied in the 
sidewalk behavior is precisely what the anthropologist is trying to capture so 
that she might properly understand the sidewalk behavior, which means she 
is seeking a constitutive explanation. She must explain how the structures of 
social relations and cultural meanings that constitute the very categories of 
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Royal and non-Royal make this action recognizable as non-Royal 
debasement, as opposed to spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space 
or randomly distributed preferences for when to walk on the sidewalk versus 
the road. 
And yet, in our culture, the most common way of defining 
discrimination depends upon conceptualizing one of our society’s most 
important categories of social stratification as a trait that can be isolated and 
manipulated as a treatment, instead of as a social construct whose structure 
of meaning must be analyzed in order to make sense of a particular instance 
of action, patterned practice, or policy. 
II. THE COUNTERFACTUAL CAUSAL MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION IN 
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW 
This is not the doctrinal Part. Rather, this Part reveals that a common 
approach—perhaps the most common approach—in both law and social 
science to detecting discrimination is to measure the treatment effect of race 
in the counterfactual sense. Part III carefully explicates this counterfactual 
causal model (CCM), but for purposes of this Part the succinct sketch 
presented in the Introduction is sufficient to identify its pervasiveness, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in both domains. 
I provide an overview of both law and social science because my sense 
is that the hegemony of the CCM is the product of multiple, interactive 
developments including, on the one hand, an intentional drive to narrow the 
ambits of equal protection doctrine, and on the other hand, quantitative 
methods for detecting discrimination filling in a substantive meaning of the 
concept DISCRIMINATION that is otherwise lacking with indeterminate formal 
formulations such as “equal protection,” “treating like cases alike,” or 
“similarly situated.”42 At the risk of being repetitive, this Part does not 
evaluate whether the studies and cases cited in this Section correctly detect 
discrimination, because my argument is that we can never answer that 
question without a prior sociological account of the category and moral 
theory of fair decision-making or resource allocation in the relevant domain 
in light of what the category is in a particular place and time. My aim is 
simply to show that these studies often proceed as if the aim of the exercise 
is to get at a pure treatment effect of race or ethnicity presuming there is an 
objective trait there to be gotten at after stripping away confounders.  
Many social scientists explicitly embrace a definition of discrimination 
as the causal effect of race (or ethnicity or sex). For example, the prestigious 
 
 42 Explaining how and why this model came to occupy the position it does is a project for another 
article altogether. 
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National Research Council’s report Measuring Racial Discrimination says 
that “to measure discrimination researchers must answer the counterfactual 
question: What would have happened to a nonwhite individual if he or she 
had been white?”43 The report goes on to illustrate both the logic of 
counterfactual causal inference and the conceptualization of race implicated 
by the model by appealing to Dr. Seuss’s book The Sneetches. In that book, 
Sneetches stamped with a star get access to all sorts of social goods (like 
killer hot dogs) while starless Sneetches are excluded, get lesser goods (like 
tofu-dogs), and are despised. The authors note that because we cannot 
“stamp” race on individuals and thereby directly observe counterfactual 
outcomes on the same humans with different racial stamps at different times, 
we must resort to second-best methods for drawing causal inferences about 
the causal impact of race.44 Numerous scholars praise the precision of the 
counterfactual causal definition of discrimination and name audit studies as 
the gold standard in causal inference.45 Many notable studies of 
discrimination in various arenas explicitly or implicitly adopt this model, 
either by defining discrimination as the causal effect of race alone, or simply 
by adopting a method that attempts to compare outcomes between units of 
different racial status that are similarly situated with respect to an exhaustive 
 
 43 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 77 (Rebecca M. Blank et 
al. eds., 2004). Indeed, the chapter is entitled “Causal Inference and the Assessment of Racial 
Discrimination.” 
 44 Observational studies are placed lower down in the “hierarchy of approaches to data collection.” 
Id. at 81. 
 45 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment 
by Police, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 487 (2016) (“Auditing has not been tried or even discussed in the 
law enforcement field, which is surprising because for decades it has been a central tool in 
antidiscrimination research and civil rights enforcement more generally. It presents safety, legality, and 
efficacy concerns when applied to policing, but with careful design I argue that these concerns can be 
overcome. If so, auditing could provide something observational research usually cannot: causally 
rigorous analysis of police discrimination in a real-world setting.”); Lincoln Quillian, Book Review, 
35 CONTEMP. SOC. 88, 89 (2006) (reviewing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43) (“Racial 
discrimination is defined with reference to counterfactual notions of causality developed in statistics: 
racial discrimination for an individual is the difference in an outcome if an individual were of one race 
contrasted to another race. This definition is cleverly illustrated with reference to the Dr. Seuss story The 
Sneetches. The fundamental methodological problem of measuring discrimination results because, unlike 
the Sneetches, we do not observe outcomes for each person under both racial conditions. Instead, we must 
use indirect techniques to estimate the magnitude of racial discrimination.”). A more recent National 
Academies report also endorses the counterfactual causal definition of discrimination, with the 
qualification that laboratory methods for detecting it face external validity challenges. NATIONAL 
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 256 (2018) 
(“Studies of behavior in a simulated laboratory environment[] offer the benefit of studying how people 
make decisions in situations where, by construction, the only variable that differs across encounters is the 
race of the subject.”). 
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set of imaginably decision-relevant characteristics (often limited by what is 
available in administrative data).46 
Nothing in the text of the Constitution necessitates specifying racial 
discrimination as the CCM; the relevant text merely articulates practically 
indeterminate formal principles. The Fourteenth Amendment commands that 
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws”; here, as in any other principle of formal equality, there is no 
way to apply the principle without an independent account of what equal 
protection means and the values underlying such a judgment.47 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . 
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.”48 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis,49 
 
 46 See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Market, in 
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3143, 3192 (1999), https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/labchp/3-48.html 
[https://perma.cc/MF32-MF8G] (“To investigate the presence of discrimination, one would like to be able 
to compare the outcomes of individuals in the same job who are identical in all respects that are relevant 
to performance but who differ only in race, ethnicity or gender.”); Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The 
Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer 
Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 184 (2008) (“While statistical models represent an extremely important 
approach to the study of race differentials, researchers should use caution in making causal interpretations 
of the indirect measures of discrimination derived from residual estimates.”); Lincoln Quillian, New 
Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 299, 302 (2006) 
(“To estimate the magnitude of discrimination in a particular context then involves answering a 
counterfactual question: What would the treatment of target group members have been if they had been 
dominant group members? This counterfactual notion of discrimination measurement corresponds to the 
use of counterfactuals in the causal effects literature (Winship & Morgan 1999). Discrimination is the 
causal effect of race on an outcome with other factors held constant.”); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical 
Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force 35–38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 22399, 2018). 
 47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The entire “equality of what” debate in egalitarianism is about this 
same issue. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities, 56 LOUVAIN 
ECON. REV. 357, 357 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 185, 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 283, 283 (1981); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 307 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995). And for a brilliant critique of the 
terms in which this debate is framed, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 
109 ETHICS 287, 287 (1999). Similar arguments about the need for a substantive account of the values 
behind equality or the material to be equalized have been artfully developed in other subject areas such 
as tort law, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill Lecture in 
Jurisprudence and Public Policy), 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 91 (1995), and of course extensively in 
antidiscrimination law, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 9, 9 (2003); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107–
08 (1976); Post, supra note 30, at 14. 
 48 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 49 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends 
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply 
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the formal equal protection demand to treat like cases alike has boiled down 
to three doctrinal formulations of discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause in federal courts: (1) explicit racial classification;50 (2) facially neutral 
law or policy that has a disparate racial impact and was motivated by 
discriminatory animus or intent;51 and (3) facially neutral law or policy that 
is applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner and results in a disparate 
impact.52 
The practical result is that in order for a litigant to show that a particular 
practice that does not facially classify by race was discriminatory, he or she 
must show that the practice had discriminatory effects and that the decision-
maker intended to discriminate. Circularity at its finest: Discrimination = 
discriminatory effect + discriminatory intent.53 The term we are trying to 
define enters into the terms doing the definitional work and is seemingly 
essential to it, as otherwise we have no way of distinguishing permissible 
from impermissible effects and intents. 
Faced with an indeterminate circular definition, one can see the 
attraction of the CCM: it seems to provide a way of distinguishing between 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory effects by reference to what is 
essentially functionally rational criteria. In selective prosecution and 
enforcement cases (i.e., discrimination by law enforcement in selection of 
targets, or discrimination by prosecutors regarding cases referred by law 
enforcement, respectively), that is usually articulated as the “similarly 
situated” test: “[C]ourts have required a defendant to make a credible 
showing that a similarly situated individual of another race or ethnicity could 
 
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to 
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 50 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 51 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding an Alabama law 
disenfranchising those convicted of certain crimes invalid because it was enacted with a racially 
discriminatory purpose and had a racially disparate impact). 
 52 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its 
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in 
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of 
the Constitution.”); see also Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to 
establish a violation of equal protection by intentional discrimination may proceed in ‘several ways,’ 
including by pointing to a law that expressly classifies on the basis of race, a facially neutral law or policy 
that has been applied in an unlawfully discriminatory manner, or a facially neutral policy that has an 
adverse effect and that was motivated by discriminatory animus.”). 
 53 For example, consider the following explication: “[A] plaintiff alleging the discriminatory 
application of a neutral law or policy must demonstrate that the application of the policy was motivated 
by discrimination.” Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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have been subjected to the same law enforcement action as the defendant, 
but was not.”54 
The obvious problem with defining unlawful discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as synonymous with functional irrationality is that 
it undercuts the entire logic of equal protection jurisprudence’s graded 
scrutiny scale under which allegations of racial discrimination are subject to 
the most exacting demands for rationality.55 Some prior principle is 
necessary to explain why the state need only proffer some minimally logical 
account for how a nonracial classification—such as “bunioned,” i.e., the 
status of having a bunion—advances a legitimate state interest, whereas 
racial classifications require “the most exact connection between 
justification and classification,” in order to “satisfy this searching standard 
of review,” in which the state must demonstrate that the classification was 
“‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”56 An 
obvious candidate would be the famous Carolene Products-footnote-four-
type answer: that being in the group designated “black” in America is 
associated with political vulnerability, a history of social exclusion, 
economic disadvantage, and cultural prejudice, whereas being in the group 
“bunioned” is not.57 But once one accepts such a principle to justify the 
graded scrutiny scale (which, alternatively, could just as well be expressed 
in terms of what sorts of rationales or state interests will be recognized as 
legitimate for different types of groups), then the most concerning forms of 
discrimination cannot be defined as decision-making on the basis of 
 
 54 United States v. Duque–Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153 (D. Kan. 2004). 
This element of a “similarly situated individual” has been applied in claims of selective 
prosecution, to require a defendant to show not only that his racial or ethnic group is prosecuted 
more than another group, but that a similarly situated individual in another group was not 
prosecuted for the same offense. 
Id. 
 55 “It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is 
to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944). 
 56 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 57 The famous footnote emerged from a case where the Court upheld a statute forbidding the 
interstate commerce in “filled milk,” stating that “the existence of facts supporting the legislative 
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions”; 
however, “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” including “statutes 
directed at particular religious . . . or racial minorities, . . . [or] against discrete and insular 
minorities . . . .” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938). 
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“irrelevant” factors.58 And yet the entire logic of the CCM is to define 
discrimination as a form of irrationality, which requires units (persons, 
neighborhoods, etc.) to present with identical functionally relevant 
characteristics in order to elicit differential effects. 
Many (but not all) courts have operationalized both requirements of an 
equal protection claim—differential outcomes by protected group 
(discriminatory effect) and differential outcome because of the protected 
group status (discriminatory intent)—in counterfactual terms.59 As the 
examples in the remainder of this Section show, litigants faced with this 
evidentiary burden often turn to quantitative methods to attempt to show both 
that there are differential outcomes by group and that, if those groups are 
otherwise similarly situated with respect to all other relevant characteristics 
or traits, race was the “cause” by elimination. To pursue this strategy, a 
litigant needs data on the relevant units indicating raced status (either at the 
individual or aggregate level depending on the unit of analysis), the outcome 
of interest (e.g., pedestrian or traffic stop, adverse police action, arrest, etc.), 
and other variables theoretically germane to the outcome. Armed with this 
data, a litigant then just needs to hire a statistical expert to use some 
methodologically sophisticated techniques to try to demonstrate that 
differential outcomes persist between “similarly situated” units. 
The promise of quantitative evidence (or experimental or quasi-
experimental evidence) is obvious: It offers a way to proceed despite the 
doctrinal narrowing of the ambits of equal protection initiated by Washington 
 
 58 The so-called “colorblindness” approach has often sounded in this “irrelevance” language. See, 
e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 730 (“Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in 
itself would ‘effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the “ultimate 
goal” of “eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human 
being’s race” will never be achieved.’” (internal citations omitted)). Presumably “irrelevance” here is 
meant aspirationally, because the statuses about which we are the most concerned will be the objects of 
discrimination are the ones where the status marker is highly correlated with other important social 
indicators—which of course is precisely why we are concerned about those statuses being the object of 
discrimination in the first instance—and therefore, it is empirically inaccurate to call the statuses 
irrelevant. 
 59 This Section presents only a few examples of common formulations when the plaintiff is alleging 
an equal protection violation of “a facially neutral” law or policy. In a case challenging, on First and Fifth 
Amendment grounds, the “passive enforcement” practice of the Selective Service in which they initiated 
prosecutions only against those individuals who either self-reported refusal to register or were reported 
by others, the Supreme Court said, “It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to 
ordinary equal protection standards. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both 
that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (internal citation omitted); 
see Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, plaintiffs must prove that the defendants’ actions had a discriminatory effect and were 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”). 
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v. Davis.60 Some litigants can show that differential outcomes persist after 
controlling for every conceivable decision-relevant variable. But many 
cannot do so. The challenge for litigants to demonstrate “similarly situated” 
units is most pronounced when the historical forces of racial and ethnic group 
formation have created separate social and physical worlds for different 
groups.61 Defendants can, drawing on their knowledge about how race and 
ethnicity structure the social world, easily construct a post hoc list of 
variables that are unequally distributed by race or ethnicity (making it very 
difficult, if not impossible, to find the applicable counterfactual) that could 
theoretically “justify” the disparate treatment. 
Quantitative evidence based on multivariable regressions can work well 
for litigants in situations where the “effect of race” on an outcome—meaning 
the statistical significance of the variable measuring race (or racial 
 
 60 As many have noted, judges politically dedicated to narrowing the uses of equal protection 
challenges have actively done so under many doctrinal formulations over recent decades. This is a 
massive topic but see, for example, IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE 158–62 (2006); Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967–1004 
(2010); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–62 (1991); 
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race 
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278–367 (2011); and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331–
87 (1988). 
 61 Sometimes, but not always, courts recognize this dilemma. In the Pyke case, which did not involve 
quantitative evidence, Native American opponents of gambling living on a reservation claimed an equal 
protection violation alleging that the state of New York failed to provide them with adequate police 
protection “because the persons in need of protection were Native Americans,” but the defendants’ 
position was that they did not send the state police “to intervene in the events occurring on the reservation 
because the Indian tribe exercises a considerable measure of self-governance on the reservation, and 
because the violence on the reservation threatened the safety of the state police officers.” Pyke v. Cuomo, 
258 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding 
that the plaintiffs failed to allege an express racial classification or show that other similarly situated 
groups were treated differently. Id. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that in a police discrimination 
case (as opposed to selective prosecution), as long as plaintiffs “allege and establish that the defendants 
discriminatorily refused to provide police protection because the plaintiffs are Native American, plaintiffs 
need not allege or establish the disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated non-Native American 
individuals.” Id. at 109. The court recognized that 
[i]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to find other individuals whose situation is similar to 
Native Americans living on a reservation and exercising a substantial measure of self-government 
independent of New York State. Plaintiffs would probably be incapable of showing similarly 
situated individuals who were treated differently. If the rule were as framed by the district court, 
police authorities could lawfully ignore the need of Native Americans for police protection on the 
basis of discriminatory anti-Indian animus. 
Id. Even if litigants are not required to come forward with similarly situated units that were treated 
differently, many courts interpret legal rules such as the following to mean the status caused the outcome 
in the counterfactual sense: “Once the plaintiff shows that the application was so motivated, ‘at least in 
part,’ the defendant must show that the same result would have occurred even without consideration of 
the plaintiffs[’] race or national origin.” Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing 
United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 612 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1188 
composition if the unit is an aggregation)—survives inclusion of a range of 
variables plausibly relevant to the outcome of interest.62 In Floyd v. City of 
New York, for instance, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the racially disparate 
impact of the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk (SQF) policy 
could not be explained by “legitimate” bases for police decisions, such as 
high crime rates in minority neighborhoods.63 The exercise of making units 
similarly situated included variables such as violent crime complaint rates, 
which the police may have actually consulted in making enforcement 
allocations.64 But the models submitted by the plaintiff’s expert did not stop 
there. They also included other variables—such as unemployment and 
housing vacancy rates—that could be theoretically relevant to the number of 
stops, but it is doubtful that the NYPD actually consulted these variables in 
its decision-making.65 The logic was that if racial composition remained a 
statistically significant predictor of the intensity of stop-and-frisks even after 
controlling for every other possible variable, then it must represent the 
residual of racially discriminatory intent. The Floyd plaintiffs were 
successful in demonstrating that the correlation between minority 
composition (at the precinct or census-tract level) and SQF rates survived 
the inclusion of a bevy of other variables plausibly relevant to police 
allocation or enforcement decisions with lots of little stars of statistical 
 
 62 I put “effect of race” in scare quotes to indicate that the term should be understood as “statements 
of association between the racial classification and a predictor or explanatory variable across individuals 
in a population.” Zuberi, supra note 31, at 178. 
 63 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (accepting statistical findings that “the NYPD carries 
out more stops in areas with more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables are 
held constant. The best predictor for the rate of stops in a geographic unit—be it precinct or census tract—
is the racial composition of that unit rather than the known crime rate”). 
 64 Interestingly, the City’s expert rebuttal report seemed to take issue even with the model that serious 
felony crime complaint rates should predict SQF rates because such a model fails to “confront the historic 
shift at NYPD away from a primary mission of responding to crime to a mission of preventing crime 
through proactive and crime targeted police vigilance.” Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D., at 4, Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS)). Besides the 
befuddling sentences, such as “[a]ny credible analysis of the determinates of stop and frisk activity must 
first control for the impact of evidence-based management practices before trying to parse out any other 
factors that may or may not have contributed to stop and frisk patterns,” it is left entirely unspecified in 
the defendant’s report what indices the police would look at to make enforcement decisions in this new 
era of scientifically managed crime prevention, if not recent past crime complaints. Id. at 5. 
 65 For example, the plaintiff’s expert analysis of SQF rates by spatial aggregations (police precincts 
in the first expert report, Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 7–8, 12, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08 
Civ. 1034 (SAS)), or census tracks in the second supplemental report, Second Supplemental Report of 
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 16–17, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS))) included variables 
about which there appeared to be little to no evidence that police actually did take into direct account in 
making patrol strength or tactics allocations, such as unemployment, median household income, housing 
vacancy, or residential mobility. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra, at 31–32. 
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significance.66 But the same analysis might not succeed in a hypersegregated 
city where the particularities of its racial history have produced a social 
geography with few if any majority-black neighborhoods that share all 
relevant characteristics with majority-white neighborhoods. 
Consider, for example, United States v. Jones, a selective prosecution 
challenge to Project Exile, which diverted gun cases from state to federal 
court, where defendants faced significantly enhanced prison sentences.67 
About 90% of the defendants in this program were black, and cases were 
diverted from just two jurisdictions: the cities of Norfolk and Richmond, 
Virginia, which had a jury pool that was about 75% African-American, 
whereas other cases were diverted to the Richmond Division of the Eastern 
District of Virginia, which had a jury pool that was about 10% African-
American; the plaintiffs submitted evidence that an AUSA “stated that one 
goal of Project Exile is to avoid ‘Richmond juries.’”68 Nonetheless, the court 
stated that, while 
Project Exile would be vulnerable on selective prosecution grounds if African-
American defendants were routinely diverted from state to federal prosecution 
while prosecutors allowed similarly situated Caucasian defendants to remain in 
state court[,] . . . [plaintiff] presents no evidence of Caucasian defendants 
similarly situated to defendant Jones evading diversion to federal court.69  
The court was moved by the Government’s claim that “[t]hose who 
implemented Project Exile have targeted cities in which violent crime is most 
 
 66 “After controlling for crime (prior month) and other tract social and economic characteristics plus 
patrol strength, the percent black or Hispanic in the census tract significantly and positively predicts the 
likelihood of Black suspects or Hispanic[] suspects being stopped relative to Whites.” Second 
Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra note 65, at 19. 
 67 “Under Project Exile, local police review each firearm-related offense to determine whether the 
conduct alleged also constitutes a federal crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(g) (prohibiting 
the possession of firearms by certain persons).” United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va. 
1999). Establishing discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent is further complicated by the 
deference courts give certain categories of officials. Although the Supreme Court has instructed courts to 
“judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards,” Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), it has also gone to great lengths to say that separation of powers requires 
courts to respect the discretion of prosecutors in selecting targets for prosecution. See United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial 
power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 
(1985))); United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Armstrong was about prosecutorial 
discretion. The defendants assumed that state and federal law-enforcement agents arrested all those they 
found dealing in crack cocaine, and they suspected that the federal prosecutor was charging the black 
suspects while letting the white suspects go. The Supreme Court replied that federal prosecutors deserve 
a strong presumption of honest and constitutional behavior, which cannot be overcome simply by a racial 
disproportion in the outcome, for disparate impact differs from discriminatory intent.”). 
 68 Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 307–08. 
 69 Id. at 311. 
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prevalent,” which, because of the history of racial segregation and 
discrimination, in most American cities are almost always the same spaces 
that are predominantly African-American.70 
Or consider how the counterfactual model of discrimination plays out 
in a series of “phony stash house” cases from across the country, in which 
various law enforcement agencies use undercover agents or confidential 
informants recruit targets to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent 
stash house.71 Once the robbery is arranged and coconspirators are recruited, 
the targets are arrested and charged. Defendants have sought to dismiss 
indictments on grounds of racial profiling or sought discovery in the hopes 
of establishing as much. Most—though not all72—judges have denied 
defendants’ motions on the grounds that they could not prove that “similarly 
situated” whites were not targeted.73 In the face of overwhelming disparate 
 
 70 Id. at 312. 
 71 “Since 2006, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (the ‘ATF’) has engaged 
in sting operations wherein undercover agents present individuals in this District with an opportunity to 
rob a fictitious drug stash house.” United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
Developed by the ATF in the 1980s to combat a rise in professional robbery crews targeting stash 
houses, reverse sting operations have grown increasingly controversial over the years, even as 
they have grown safer and more refined. For one, they empower law enforcement to craft offenses 
out of whole cloth, often corresponding to statutory offense thresholds. Here, the entirely fictitious 
10 kilograms of cocaine triggered a very real 20-year mandatory minimum for Washington, 
contributing to a total sentence of 264 months in prison—far more than even the ringleader of the 
conspiracy received. For another, and as Washington claimed on multiple occasions before the 
District Court—and now again on appeal—people of color are allegedly swept up in the stings in 
disproportionate numbers. 
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 713 (2018); John 
Diedrich & Raquel Rutledge, ATF Uses Rogue Tactics in Storefront Stings Across Nation, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL (Dec. 7, 2013), http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/atf-uses-rogue-
tactics-in-storefront-stings-across-the-nation-b99146765z1-234916641.html [https://perma.cc/W8U3-
264U]. 
 72 See, e.g., Davis, 793 F.3d at 715, 723 (holding that limited discovery is appropriate in face of 
statistics that of twenty stash house stings, seventy-five defendants were African-American, thirteen were 
Hispanic, and only six were non-Hispanic whites). 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Payne, No. 12 CR 854 (CRN), slip. op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015) 
(where statistics showing that only one of twenty-six stash house cases had a white defendant and almost 
80% of defendants were African-American were insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory effect 
because there is “no evidence . . . of other similarly situated individuals of a different race who were not 
prosecuted”). In Lamar, the judge rejected the defendant’s claim that, given the existence of white 
individuals with a similar criminal record, this pattern constituted sufficient evidence of discriminatory 
effect to compel discovery on how the DEA selection took place:  
The fact that none of the 95 defendants in these cases is white does not constitute “some evidence” 
of either discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. A close review of the complaints in these 
eighteen cases reveals that 76 of the 95 defendants in these cases were recruited not by a DEA 
informant, but instead by a coconspirator. 
United States v. Lamar, No. 14 CR 726 (PGG), 2015 WL 4720282, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015). The 
court went on to reason in counterfactual terms, noting that the defendants conceded:  
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racial impact, litigants are still expected to show that the effect of race and 
race alone can be isolated from other factors to support a counterfactual 
causal account of discrimination. One judge explained that defendants did 
not meet their burden even to obtain discovery where zero of ninety-five 
defendants in eighteen robbery sting cases in the Southern District of New 
York were white because, among other things, they did not point to 
incredibly specific evidence that “any white person who had been sentenced 
under the Robbery Guidelines, or who had served time in a New York state 
prison for a violent felony, ever told a DEA informant about past 
involvement in robbing drug dealers but was not targeted for a sting 
operation.”74 
Even if discovery is provided, it is not difficult for law enforcement to 
come forward with plausible bases to distinguish potential targets as not 
“similarly situated,” especially post hoc and especially when there are highly 
unequal distributions between groups of variables that are plausibly rational 
for law enforcement to consider, such as residence in high crime 
neighborhoods or criminal history. Consider how this played out in a series 
of high profile phony stash house cases in Chicago, where the court rejected 
the defendants’ motions to dismiss indictments on equal protection grounds 
after substantial discovery was provided and extensive warring expert 
reports submitted, despite the judge’s statement that “[i]t is time for these 
false stash house cases to end and be relegated to the dark corridors of our 
past.”75 Both experts—for the defendants seeking to establish discrimination 
and for the government seeking to refute it—made their case in explicitly 
counterfactual terms by arguing that they could (or could not) isolate the 
effect of race in enforcement target selection;76 and the court approached the 
 
[They] have no “direct evidence” that (1) “an informant ever told [the DEA agents involved in 
this case] about a white person who had robbed drug dealers or who might be interested in robbing 
drug dealers, and that [the DEA agents involved in this case] indicated that they were [not] 
interested in pursuing that person”; and (2) the DEA agents involved in this case “instructed 
informants that the DEA was only interested in targeting non-white people who robbed drug 
dealers or might be interested in robbing drug dealers.” 
Id. at *10. Disclosure: I submitted an expert report in this case. 
 74 Lamar, 2015 WL 4720282, at *15. 
 75 Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 983–84. 
 76 See, e.g., Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 27–28, Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (No. 12-CR-632 
(RC)) (citing audit studies as the ideal experiment to isolate the causal effect of race and adopting 
propensity score matching to “simulate[] random assignment to a treatment group–race–by matching 
persons on numerous predictors of treatment assignment”); Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach at 
12, Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (No. 12-CR-632 (RC)) (arguing that to interpret residual differences in 
likelihood of being targeted to discrimination methods must eliminate any systematic differences between 
groups—including “willing[ness] to participate in a stash house robbery”—except for the racial/ethnic 
status: “The control variables must capture the underlying differences between black, Hispanic, and white 
offenders in the sample to such an extent that we can interpret the remaining differences between these 
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evaluation of the evidence in counterfactual terms.77 After an in-depth review 
of the voluminous reports, the court held that the defendants failed to 
establish either discriminatory effect or intent for many varied and complex 
reasons; relevant to the discussion here, it concluded that the defendants did 
not proffer a sufficiently “similarly situated” group of potential white targets 
to prove race was the causal factor in enforcement selection.78 The 
counterfactual causal model proceeds as if race consists in only its 
signifiers—say an attribute A—and discrimination is defined as the effect of 
that A on an outcome when everything else—call them all of the other Xs—
are held constant. If there is no prior sociological account of the distribution 
and meaning of the Xs by different racial/ethnic groups and no prior moral 
equality-of-what theory designating in what fairness consists of given the 
differential distribution and meaning of Xs by group, then there is no limiting 
principle on what should or should not be stripped away in order to get at 
some imagined solid state of race or ethnicity. 
This logic is also on display in the use of racial-specific or ethnic-
specific crime rates.79 It turns out that far from the soaring rhetoric that “the 
Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not “as simply components 
 
groups as caused by discrimination.”). Sometimes the experts conflate two quite distinct counterfactual 
questions, namely (1) What would the racial composition of phony stash house sting defendants be if the 
ATF had been presented with a given quantum of potential black, Hispanic, and white targets that were 
identical in all Xs (all conceivably relevant variables) except racial/ethnic status?, with (2) What would 
the racial composition of the phony stash house sting defendants be if the ATF selected enforcement 
targets in a nondiscriminatory fashion? See, e.g., Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach, supra, at 4. 
The former is the CCM that I critique throughout on the grounds that it cannot identify discrimination 
without a sociological account of the distribution and meaning of Xs by different racial/ethnic group and 
a moral account of what enforcement target selection processes are fair or just given the differential 
distribution and meaning of Xs by group. The latter proffers a counterfactual normative criterion that is 
undefined, which would need to be given some content to know what its operation would generate 
empirically. 
77 [I]f Defendants prove that law enforcement agents would not have pursued these investigations 
had they been white, dismissal of the charges is warranted. “If not, there would not be a basis to 
attribute this prosecution to the defendants’ race,” and the case must proceed to a resolution of 
the charges. 
Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 995, 1006 (internal citation omitted). 
 78 Id. at 1013, 1022. 
 79 See, e.g., United States v. Duque–Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160 (D. Kan. 2004) (discussing 
Hispanic profiling in Kansas, “the proper consideration here is whether there are any differences in the 
incidence of traffic violations by different racial and ethnic groups when one considers all such violations, 
and when one considers the host of reasons officers rely on in effecting a traffic stop”). I do not believe 
that “similarly situated” with respect to functionally relevant characteristics is really doing the work it 
claims to be doing in these cases, because the entire basis of concern about a group being the target of 
discrimination is that one group is systematically different from another in socially important ways. Upon 
closer inspection, the similarly situated inquiry is precisely where courts—without any explicit 
acknowledgement—engage a substantive equality-of-what theory, specifying which facts that construct 
racial and ethnic groups will be countenanced and which will not. 
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of a racial, religious, sexual or national class,”’” courts end up engaging 
social facts about an individual’s ascriptive group when it comes to this type 
of inquiry.80 The claim that the black stop rate should be proportional to the 
rate at which complainants of violent crime describe the perpetrator as black, 
or that the racial composition of phony stash house sting defendants should 
match the composition of those arrested for home invasions with a firearm 
or with “willingness” to participate in a stash house robbery, means that an 
individual’s risk of stop or targeting is evaluated as fair by reference to a 
proffered empirical fact about their ascribed group (or the “propensity” of 
their ascribed group).81 Let’s leave aside the difficulty of knowing the true 
rates at which people ascribed to different ethnic or racial groups engage in 
the offenses at issue in a particular discriminatory enforcement claim, or the 
difficulty of assigning people to designated groups in a way that is not 
endogenous to identifying an instance of the offense.82 Proposing evidence 
of differential racial or ethnic group offense rates to defeat a claim of 
discrimination in a particular enforcement policy only works if one accepts 
some prior independent moral justification of the policy or practice given the 
claimed racial- or ethnic-specific offense rates. Declaring that the 
enforcement action happens because of the underlying offending conduct—
and not because of race or ethnicity—is simply question-begging. The entire 
premise of the discriminatory effects inquiry is to designate criteria by which 
a policy that does not on its face classify by race or ethnicity produces 
patterns that will be recognized as DISCRIMINATORY. 
Many courts take the identical information—proffered racial- or ethnic-
specific conduct rates—and insist that it is essential contextual evidence for 
deciding if the effects really are discriminatory, but irrelevant for 
 
 80 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 81 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The City’s experts . . . 
used a benchmark consisting of the rates at which various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime 
victims—in other words, ‘suspect race description data’ . . . [and] assumed that if officers’ stop decisions 
were racially unbiased, then the racial distribution of stopped pedestrians would be the same as the racial 
distribution of the criminal suspects in the area.”); see also Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1012–13 (discussing 
the Government’s expert report, “[a]s a ‘counterfactual’ to Professor Fagan’s findings, Professor 
Schanzenbach . . . found that black, white, and Hispanic defendants in the stash house cases had 
statistically similar criminal histories, and that on average, black defendants had more convictions, arrests, 
and sentences, and were more likely to have been convicted or arrested for a weapons offense than white 
defendants[;] . . . [o]f those arrested for weapons offenses, 72.5 percent were black and 15 percent were 
Hispanic[;] . . . for home invasion with a firearm, 75.4 percent were black and 12 percent were Hispanic”). 
 82 Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the United States, 
118 AM. J. SOC. 676, 712 (2012) (showing that external racial identification changes over time by 
redefining successful or high-status people as white (or not black) and unsuccessful or low-status people 
as black (or not white)). 
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determining whether to infer discriminatory intent.83 Consider, for example, 
that many courts ruled that public perception of crack as a “black drug” was 
irrelevant to finding that the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and 
powdered cocaine was motivated by discriminatory intent.84 The same 
statistical facts that must be recognized to defuse the allegation of 
discriminatory effect—say, a proffered correlation between group 
membership and the facial target of the enforcement policy—are ignored 
when interpreting the meaning of acting on the facial target of the 
enforcement policy. 
Having shown that many courts employ counterfactual-type reasoning 
to evaluate evidence of racial and ethnic discrimination, the following Part 
formalizes the counterfactual causal model in order to clarify precisely what 
it means to talk about race as a cause in the counterfactual sense, and what it 
means to define racial discrimination as the causal effect of race- or 
ethnicity-qua-treatment. Most federal judges are not familiar with the 
counterfactual causal framework presented in the next Part (although many 
experts employed to provide statistical services are), and I certainly do not 
contend that they are always consciously appealing to the formal model 
when they approach discrimination cases. I do contend that if confronted 
with the formalization, many of these legal actors would agree that it 
represents the type of exercise in which they are engaged when detecting 
discrimination. 
 
 83 Litigants claiming discrimination must show that a decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon 
an identifiable group.” Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also Hunter v. 
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (“Presented with a neutral state law that produces 
disproportionate effects along racial lines, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the approach of 
Arlington Heights to determine whether the law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: ‘[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’” (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977))). 
 84 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713 
(8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the idea that “Congress’ failure to account for a substantial and foreseeable 
disparate impact” of the crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines on African-Americans could violate “the 
spirit and letter of equal protection” because “belief that racial animus was a motivating factor, based on 
disproportionate impact, is simply not enough since the Equal Protection Clause is violated ‘only if that 
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.’ The chain of reasoning of the district court simply will 
not support a conclusion or a finding that the crack statutes were passed ‘because of, not merely in spite 
of’ the adverse effect upon an identifiable group” (internal citations omitted)); David A. Sklansky, 
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1995). 
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III. THE FORMAL MODEL AND RACE AS A TREATMENT 
The mechanics are a bit tedious, but it is important to explicitly detail 
the primitives of the counterfactual model in order to clarify (1) what 
definition of causality is at work, and (2) what conditions must obtain in 
order to make meaningful empirical claims about the operation of causality 
if one is using the word “cause” in the counterfactual sense. Only after 
rigorously specifying what cause-qua-treatment means in the counterfactual 
model can we understand the objections to identifying discrimination as the 
treatment effect of race or ethnicity. 
The primitives of the theory are as follows: 
U is a population of n units consisting of ui . . . n. 
Z is a treatment variable such that Z=t if ui is exposed to treatment conditions; 
Z=c if ui is exposed to control conditions (no treatment). 
Y is an outcome variable of interest measured on the units in U after 
experiencing Z=t or Z=c.85 
The most simplistic causal question defines just two potential causes 
(or levels of treatment): t for treatment and c for control (some defined non-
t state). Consider Z to be a variable indicating whether U is exposed to 
treatment, in which case Z=t, or control, i.e., no treatment, in which case 
Z=c. Each unit must be potentially exposable to either c or t. The variable Y 
defines an outcome of interest on each unit in U. The outcome variable Y is 
some measure of the effect of Z on an outcome on U that is, through some 
measurement mechanism, assigned a value. 
The heart of the potential outcomes models is that we must define not 
just one value of the outcome variable for each unit but two: Yt(u) indicates 
the value of the response variable for unit u when exposed to t; Yc(u) 
indicates the value of the response variable for unit u when exposed to c (not-
t).86 The treatment is some occurrence with a specific temporality and so the 
 
 85 The counterfactual model of causation is sometimes also called the “Rubin Model” or the 
“potential outcomes” framework. There is a massive amount of literature on this, but just to name a few 
seminal works, see, for example, STEPHEN L. MORGAN & CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP, COUNTERFACTUALS 
AND CAUSAL INFERENCE: METHODS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (2007); Holland, supra 
note 13, at 959; Donald B. Rubin, Comment: Which Ifs Have Causal Answers, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 
961, 961–62 (1986); and Jerzy Splawa-Neyman, On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural 
Experiments. Essay on Principles. Section 9., 5 STAT. SCI. 465 (1990). For a very clear and accessible 
summary, see D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 
557–63 (2008). 
 86 For simplicity’s sake, I follow Holland and denote the value of the outcome variable on unit ui for 
the world in which the unit experiences the treatment, Z=t, as Yt(u), and the value of the outcome variable 
on unit ui for the world in which the unit experiences the control, Z=c, as Yc(u). Holland, supra note 13, 
at 947. 
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response variable Y must be measured at some point in time after t or c is 
determined. 
The individual causal effect of treatment t as measured by outcome 
variable Y (relative to control state c) on unit u is defined as Yt(u) – Yc(u). 
Note the causal effect is defined as the difference in the response variable 
under treatment and control conditions for the same unit: it is the difference 
between the value of Y for unit u that would obtain under treatment t, and 
the value of Y for unit u that would obtain under control conditions. A causal 
effect is defined in reference to a clear counterfactual (not-t, i.e., c), hence 
the name counterfactual or potential outcome. 
Causes in the statistical counterfactual paradigm must be, at the risk of 
mixing disciplinary metaphors, what philosopher David Lewis called “non-
backtracking”; that is, it must be possible to imagine a treatment on the unit 
at a given time (time=1) that does not entail a host of other changes to the 
unit prior to that moment (time<1).87 Backtracking counterfactuals recognize 
that there are some changes in the current state of affairs that necessarily 
imply that other entangled states were also changed. As Lewis explained, “if 
the present were different, the past would be different too.”88 By way of 
example, consider an attempt to measure the causal impact of Hillary 
Clinton—as opposed to Donald Trump—being inaugurated on January 20th, 
2017 on Washington, D.C. Metro ridership. Obviously, a number of other 
entangled prior events—potentially ranging from voter turnout to the timing 
of the FBI’s announcement about finding a Clinton aide’s emails on Anthony 
Weiner’s laptop—would have to have turned out differently in the past for a 
Clinton inauguration to be a potential cause of a change in D.C. Metro 
ridership. Such a question can only be specified as a backtracking 
counterfactual. But treatments in the statistical counterfactual model exclude 
backtracking. The model requires the possibility of a treated and nontreated 
state for otherwise identical units that could bring about different potential 
outcome states in the future without the treatment entailing other changes to 
the unit in the past.89 
The fact that causation is defined in terms of the counterfactual 
experience of one unit in two alternative conditions leads to what has been 
 
 87 See 2 DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 33–35 (1986). As Lewis wrote, “[c]ounterfactuals 
are infected with vagueness,” and “[d]ifferent ways of (partly) resolving the vagueness are appropriate in 
different contexts.” Id. at 34. 
 88 Id. at 33. 
 89 As Lewis explained the nonbacktracking counterfactual requirement, “[I]f the present were 
different the past would be the same, but the same past causes would fail somehow to cause the same 
present effects.” Id. at 34. 
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termed the “fundamental problem of causal inference.”90 We only observe 
either Yt(u) or Yc(u), so we can never identify the true causal effect. Bummer. 
There are various methodological deliverances from this apparent 
epistemic bummer. For purposes of our discussion here, the logic of these 
methods involves trying to create or identify subgroupings of U exposed to 
either t or c and measuring the outcome of interest, Y, on those subgroupings. 
The aim of the various techniques is either to construct an assignment 
process whereby there would be no reason to think there is a correlation 
between the outcome of interest and assignment to the treatment category 
(known as ignorability), or somehow to retroactively “balance” theoretically 
relevant variables between the treated and control subgroups. Stated with 
extreme simplification, one gets around the fundamental problem of causal 
inference either by randomly assigning treatment, or by reconstructing two 
groups of treated and control units that are similarly situated with respect to 
all relevant variables and then estimating the average treatment effect 
between the treated and control groups.91 
A. Is Race a Treatment? The Rubian Statistician’s Objection 
Can race be a treatment—and thus a cause—in the counterfactual 
framework? Surprisingly, given how common it is to talk about race as a 
cause in this way, most statisticians working in this tradition would say no. 
Or, more specifically, they would say no if the units about which we are 
making causal inferences are the raced units (such as individuals). Although 
many people have voiced this objection, I am calling it the Rubian 
statistician’s objection after Donald Rubin, one of the early innovators of the 
formal counterfactual causal model.92 Most people working in this 
 
 90 Holland, supra note 13, at 947. 
 91 Quick and dirty, it goes like this: First, define the average causal effect, T, of treatment t (relative 
to control state c) over many units in the population, U, as the expected value of the difference Yt(u) – 
Yc(u) over all the u’s in U: T = E[Yt] – E[Yc]. Second, estimate what is observable: T* = E[Yt|t] – E[Yc|c]. 
Third, figure out under what conditions one might think that T* = T, i.e., disentangle association from 
causation. The logic is to use other units to fill in the missing values of the counterfactual outcomes of 
the units for the treatment or control each did not receive. There are a number of other assumptions 
necessary to draw causal inferences not discussed at length here (for example, the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA), which means the treatment status of any unit does not affect the potential 
outcomes of the other units (noninterference) and the treatments for all units are comparable (no variation 
in treatment or, said another way, the outcome value for unit u when exposed to treatment t (Yt) is the 
same no matter what mechanism is used to assign the unit to the treatment)). 
 92 As Rubin put it, 
[W]ithin our model, each of the T treatments must consist of a series of actions that could be 
applied to each experimental unit. This requirement may seem obvious, but some colloquial uses 
of “cause” specify treatments that either cannot be applied or are so ambiguous that no series of 
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framework would say a question like “Did Eddie Murphy’s race cause him 
to get a free newspaper?” does not have meaning in the counterfactual causal 
sense. 
The first issue the Rubian statistician points to is that, as described 
above, causes are interventions with a discrete temporal dimension. A 
treatment (Z) is a manipulation of something on a unit (u) or something to 
which the unit can be exposed that we hypothesize would bring about a 
change in a measured outcome of interest (Y) about u. The unit must be 
susceptible of being subject to the two distinct states of treated and 
nontreated (Z=t and Z=c) such that it is meaningful to talk about the potential 
outcomes of the same unit in these two states, Yt(u) or Yc(u). The famous 
Rubin/Holland slogan—“No causation without manipulation”—captures the 
definitional requirement in the counterfactual model that causes are only 
those things that we can, at least hypothetically, bring about on the unit.93 If 
Eddie Murphy’s race is an “immutable characteristic” assigned at birth, then 
it is not meaningful to talk about his race as a cause of an outcome within the 
counterfactual causal paradigm because it cannot be intervened on at some 
later point.94 Race is not a manipulative variable on the unit, but a trait of the 
unit of interest.95 
 
actions can be inferred from the description of the treatment; such questions have no causal answer 
within our framework. 
Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects: The Role of Randomization, 6 ANNALS STAT. 
34, 39 (1978). 
 93 Holland, supra note 13, at 959. 
An attribute cannot be a cause in an experiment, because the notion of potential exposability does 
not apply to it. The only way for an attribute to change its value is for the unit to change in some 
way and no longer be the same unit. Statements of “causation” that involve attributes as “causes” 
are always statements of association between the values of an attribute and a response variable 
across the units in a population. 
Id. at 955; see also Tyler J. VanderWeele & Whitney R. Robinson, On the Causal Interpretation of Race 
in Regressions Adjusting for Confounding and Mediating Variables, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 473, 473 (2014) 
(“Part of the challenge of interpreting race coefficients causally is that, in the formal causal inference 
literature, effects are often defined in terms of counterfactual or potential outcomes, which are in turn 
defined as the outcomes that would result under hypothetical interventions. There are, however, no 
reasonable hypothetical interventions on race when race itself is the exposure.” (footnote omitted)). 
 94 There are many critiques of the Rubian causal framework and different approaches to causality, 
but I focus on this framework because it best captures the hegemonic approach in courts and social science 
of defining discrimination as a causal relation between a protected attribute and an outcome. 
 95 The statistician’s objection to thinking about race as a cause-qua-treatment is often explained (and 
debated) in terms of nonmanipulability: the physical impossibility of bringing about a change in the race 
of an individual at some point after birth. E.g., JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY 
OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION 132 (2003); Alexandre Marcellesi, Is Race a Cause?, 80 PHIL. SCI. 650, 652–
53 (2013). But, as explained below, the entire terms of that debate miss the real question—What notion 
of RACE is presupposed by a model in which it can theoretically be a treatment, and is that notion 
sociologically plausible? 
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Second, as a consequence of this, the most important other facts about 
the unit happen posttreatment, and therefore, there is no way to separate out 
the causal effect of the treatment from mechanisms or intermediate 
outcomes. It is meaningless to talk about, for example, a white Eddie 
Murphy, because every aspect of Eddie Murphy’s person from birth onwards 
was formed by living as a black man in the United States of America. The 
methodological problem this poses is that we cannot separate the fact of 
Eddie Murphy being black from other facts about him—class, education, 
humor, affect, dress, speech, etc.—in order to isolate the causal force of race 
alone on an outcome of interest. To use the language of backtracking, it is 
hard to imagine a treatment to his person to be white at, say, age twenty-
three, without backtracking a substantial number of other facts about his life 
that would have been different if he had been born, raised, and perceived to 
be white his entire life prior to age twenty-three. With respect to 
observational methods that try to construct comparable subgroupings, we 
cannot “control for” or “balance on” all of the theoretically relevant 
posttreatment intermediate outcomes because, said in fancy statistical 
language, “controlling for a post-treatment variable messes up the estimate 
of total treatment effect . . . .”96 
These are the standard statistical, definitional, and methodological 
objections to talking about race as a cause-qua-treatment. Much of this has 
been stated, restated, and debated at length in the social science and statistics 
literature.97 Ultimately, I want to put a sociological spin on the Rubian 
statistician’s objection, but for now I sum up the statistician’s objections to 
talking about race as a treatment in two points: (1) nonmanipulability: the 
units are not equally potentially exposable to treatment and control; and (2) 
temporality of treatment: the inherent confoundedness of treatment effects 
and posttreatment intermediate outcomes. 
B. Is Race a Treatment? The Greiner–Rubin Statistician’s Solution 
But statisticians don’t just have objections; they also have solutions. 
The following Section argues that the statistician’s solution is an 
unsatisfactory model of discrimination for the same reasons that I believe the 
statistician’s objections outlined in the prior Section have deep sociological 
 
 96 ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 188 (2007). 
 97 See generally MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 85, at 439; D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, 
Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 775 (2011); Holland, 
supra note 13; Marcellesi, supra note 95, at 655; Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race as a Bundle of Sticks: 
Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 499 
(2016). 
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meaning, deeper meaning than I think they have been given in the 
methodological debate. But first, the proffered solution. 
The statistician’s solution to the objections to talking about race as a 
cause-qua-treatment within the counterfactual causal framework is to switch 
the unit of analysis from the raced unit (person, aggregation of persons) to 
the decision-maker confronting the raced units. James Greiner and Donald 
Rubin present the most eloquently formalized version of this solution, 
although it is the same logic informing audit or correspondence studies 
(insofar as they claim to identify a treatment effect of race, which is in no 
way a logical entailment of the method).98 Greiner and Rubin describe the 
solution as a “shift in emphasis to perceptions of immutable characteristics,” 
arguing that this “allows some well-defined causal questions to be posed and, 
within the limits of observational studies, inferences to be drawn,” or 
alternatively, at least to “identify a set of assumptions that allows causal 
analysis.”99 
The basics of the approach go something like this: The unit is a 
decision-maker with power to determine the outcome of interest (Y). The 
decision-maker perceives a distinct candidate unit (candidates for the 
outcome of interest). The treatment is the “immutable characteristic” of the 
candidate as perceived by the decision-maker.100 Thus, the unit about which 
we are making causal inferences is the decision-maker, which could be an 
individual or aggregate decision-maker such as a firm or police department. 
The treatment is the perceived race of a candidate unit, and the outcome of 
interest is some outcome (Y), over which the decision-maker has the power 
to decide. 
The statistician’s solution addresses both the manipulability and 
temporality of treatment objections summarized in the prior Section. It 
addresses the manipulability issue by varying the race of the candidate units 
 
 98 For clear explanations of the decision-maker causal inference framework, see Greiner & Rubin, 
supra note 97, at 776, and MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 85, at 440–41. 
 99 Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 776. Many people embrace this as the right conceptualization 
for thinking about discrimination as the causal effect of race, ethnicity, or sex. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. 
ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S 
COMPANION 5 (2009); Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical 
Challenges 32 (U. Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-003, Jan. 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2550032 [https://perma.cc/7XZS-FGQA]. 
 100 Greiner and Rubin use the language of “perceived race,” supra note 97, at 775, but as I will argue 
in the following Section on audit and correspondence studies, it is better described as “signaled race” 
because the treatment is using one of various ways in which the social category of race is triggered 
visually, aurally, or with written signs. See Sen & Wasow, supra note 97, at 509 (“[T]he best way to think 
about the treatment in exposure [design] studies is not as perception but instead as a signal about race. 
After all, in an experimental context, the researcher can manipulate the signal to which the subject is 
exposed but not what the subject actually perceives. Second, perceived race is rarely observed . . . .”). 
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a decision-maker perceives as opposed to manipulating the race of the 
candidates themselves. It addresses the temporality of treatment issue by 
locating the treatment at one salient moment in time—at the time the 
decision-maker is appraised of the raced status of the candidate or racial 
composition in the case of aggregate units. Defining the treatment as the 
moment of racial perception allows one to control for or balance many 
variables theoretically related both to race and to the outcome of interest, 
because they can now be thought of as pretreatment. 
As in any “clinching” deductive method, very strict assumptions must 
be fulfilled to “clinch” the conclusion of causality.101 One assumption 
necessary to draw causal inferences about the treatment effect of a perceived 
candidate’s race on a decision-maker’s outcome is that there be some clear 
concept of what the treatment and the counterfactual to the treatment is. The 
decision-maker must have in her or his mind a unitary and discrete concept 
of BLACK and WHITE (if we are talking about racial binaries) that is triggered 
by a stimulus, rather than a multidimensional conception of RACEDNESS.102 
In addition, the treatment for all units must be identical, meaning the singular 
discrete concept of BLACK and WHITE triggered by the stimulus is the same 
across potential decision-makers.103 The method of treatment must not affect 
the potential outcome, meaning how the decision-maker comes to perceive 
the raced status of the unit does not affect the outcome of interest.104 Finally, 
the noninterference assumption requires that the potential outcome of a 
particular decision-maker does not depend on the treatment of candidate 
units assigned to other decision-makers.105 
 
 101 Nancy Cartwright, Are RCTs the Gold Standard?, 2 BIOSOCIETIES 11, 12 (2007) (“Clinchers are 
deductive: if they are correctly applied and their assumptions are met, then if our evidence claims are true, 
so too will be our conclusions—a huge benefit.”). 
 102 That can be relaxed, as Greiner and Rubin point out, supra note 97, at 778, but I think that just 
pushes the envelope to depicting RACEDNESS as gradations of the solid thing RACE. 
 103 There are various ways to state the requirement that, however one defines the “treatment,” it must 
be the same thing to every unit to which it is administered. Some versions of this requirement include the 
following: there is only one version of each treatment; counterfactual states must be well-defined; the 
treatment of different units is comparable; and there is a “single essential, counterfactual state” of treated 
and control. See id. 
 104 The value of Yt(u) (the outcome for unit u when exposed to treatment t) is the same no matter 
what mechanism is used to assign the unit to the treatment. Imagine some decision-makers interact with 
the units for long periods of time and others just interact for a short period of time; “[t]he critical 
assumption here is that how the perception is created does not matter, that is, the counterfactual potential 
outcome is ‘stable,’ invariant to the nature of the evidence on which the decider’s perception is based.” 
Id. 
 105 “[P]otential outcomes for any unit of an experiment are independent of the treatment assignment 
of any other unit or population member under study.” Robert J. Sampson, Gold Standard Myths: 
Observations on the Experimental Turn in Quantitative Criminology, 26 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 489, 
492 (2010). 
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The statistician’s solution also means that the decision about when the 
treatment is conceptualized to occur is enormously important for deciding 
what variables are posttreatment and thus should not be controlled for or 
balanced on in the analysis.106 For example, consider Judge Schroeder’s 
objections to the Government’s expert Dr. John MacDonald in the Johnson 
case, who analyzed 20,059 traffic stop forms filled out by deputies in the 
Alamance County Sherriff’s Office. Dr. MacDonald attempted to estimate 
the “effect of being Latino” on post-stop outcomes, such as warnings, 
citations, or arrests, by estimating a series of logistic regressions that 
included all available control variables, which were limited in the 
administrative data.107 Judge Schroeder found this evidence unsatisfactory 
because he believed the analysis did not compare sufficiently similarly 
situated Latino and non-Latino drivers, because Dr. MacDonald did not 
include a host of conceivable control variables—such as personal affect in 
response to the police—that would only be observable post-stop.108 
Controlling for differences among drivers that officers learn after making the 
initial stop is problematic under the Greiner–Rubin framework because they 
are potentially infected by the treatment, including even perhaps recording 
of seemingly objective differences like prior criminal record or furtive 
actions because it could enter as a post hoc justification of discriminatory 
treatment.109 
 
 106 This, as I argue extensively below, is my point that the process of selecting a method for detecting 
discrimination is not merely a methodological question with normative overtones. It is the process of 
defining the concept, which is at once descriptive about the world and evaluative. 
 107 According to the court, the forms contained the following information: 
the initial reason for the traffic stop; vehicle driver information (including the driver’s race and 
ethnicity but not name); the enforcement action taken as a result of the stop (specifically, whether 
an officer issued a citation, made an arrest, issued a verbal or written warning, or made no 
enforcement action); whether the officer performed a search during the stop; the type of search 
(i.e., whether the search was based on probable cause, consented to, based on a search warrant, 
incident to arrest, or a protective frisk); whether a passenger was searched; and whether the officer 
found “contraband” (e.g., illegal drugs or weapons). 
United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 308 (M.D.N.C. 2015). 
 108 “Without controlling for these obvious, nondiscriminatory reasons for post-stop outcomes, Dr. 
MacDonald’s statistical evidence does not prove dissimilar treatment between Hispanics and similarly 
situated non-Hispanics as to stop outcome.” Id. at 363. The court was particularly concerned with the 
absence of variables measuring the “severity of the conduct” and reasons for enforcement action, saying, 
Dr. MacDonald’s analysis requires the court to assume two major propositions: (1) similarity in 
generic stop reason means similarity in the severity of the conduct resulting in the stop; and (2) 
the stop reason (which Dr. MacDonald does not purport to measure) equates causally with the 
reason for the stop outcome (which he claims to measure). 
Id. at 361–62. 
 109 Thus, even on the terms of the model, there is a substantial number of important police and 
prosecutorial decisions (such as patrol allocation by neighborhood, or subjective assessment of severity 
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The point of the Greiner–Rubin solution is to circumscribe the 
encounter of interest to a discrete set of events at and after the decision-
maker’s encounter with a candidate unit and ask how the perceived raced 
status of a unit affects the decision-maker in that discrete encounter. The 
substantive upshot of the statistician’s solution is that it operationalizes a 
definition of discrimination that necessarily excludes any historical effects 
of how race has structured units to be systematically different on relevant 
variables prior to the encounter.110 The statistician’s solution addresses the 
manipulability and temporality objections to conceptualizing race as a 
treatment. The solution also vindicates the intuition that detecting 
discrimination in a particular arena is not about seeking to hold a discrete 
decision-maker liable for the entire accumulated disadvantage between 
different groups defined by race or ethnicity. Rather, it is about holding a 
decision-maker liable for how race affected the outcome of interest in a 
particular discrete encounter over which she has control. 
Solved! 
C. Is Race a Treatment? The Sociologist’s Objection 
Not so fast. 
Let me point out something about the statistician’s solution to his 
eponymous objection. In the counterfactual framework, the sentence “A 
causes B” means “the effect of A is B.”111 The framework definitionally 
restricts the class of eligible causes to “things that could, in principle, be 
treatments in experiments,” because the framework is erected to give precise 
operational meaning to causal statements by measuring the effects of known 
causes, not the causes of observed effects.112 As I have mentioned, the Rubian 
objection is often presented in terms of nonmanipulability: the fact that units 
are not potentially exposable to being raced differently at the time of the 
relevant encounter. But physical, logistical, ethical, or practical human 
limitations to bringing about a treatment are not fatal flaws in considering 
 
of conduct) that are not susceptible to a study design that could exclude post-racial/ethnic perception 
variables, because those variables are precisely the ones that would make the units similarly situated. 
 110 Greiner and Rubin state, “Much here depends on a willingness to exonerate the decider from 
responsibility for prior events.” Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 777. I do see how even the 
paradigmatic form of invidious, or what economists call “taste-based,” discrimination do not also hold 
decision-makers responsible for prior events, namely development of invidious tastes that were learned 
and inherited from a history and culture that has constructed particular groups as disfavored and excluded. 
 111 Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference: Rejoinder, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 968, 968–
70 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
 112 Holland, supra note 13, at 954. 
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something a cause in the counterfactual model.113 As long as it is logically 
and conceptually possible to talk about administering a process on a unit that 
brings about the proffered treated state—while still retaining the unit as the 
same unit—then the proffered treatment can be labeled a cause in the 
counterfactual framework. The Greiner–Rubin solution is trying to figure out 
a way that race can be analyzed as a cause within the counterfactual 
framework, so they switch the unit of causal inference to the decision-maker 
to address the manipulability and temporality of treatment issues accordingly 
and identify perceived race as the treatment. Here is where I want to 
introduce the sociological spin on the Rubian statistician’s objection to 
talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual framework. The problem 
with talking about race as a cause-qua-treatment is not a problem with 
practical manipulability; it is a problem with the sociological and normative 
meaning of the proffered manipulation. 
Race is a fundamental structuring institution of life chances in the 
United States. Inhabiting a particular racial category not only shapes the 
opportunities, advantages, and resources that will be available in a person’s 
life course, it means living with a particular cultural meaning attached to 
one’s body. It is not meaningful to talk about an otherwise identical person 
suddenly swapping racial status at the time of a given encounter because the 
raced status a person has inhabited since birth has shaped so many aspects of 
the person relevant to the encounter that it is impossible to disentangle those 
factors from the person’s raced status. 
There is no nonbacktracking way to specify the hypothetical “treatment 
of race” on a person (or aggregation) at a given moment to measure its effect 
on an outcome of interest (much like there is no nonbacktracking way to 
specify the effect of a Clinton, as opposed to Trump, inauguration on D.C. 
Metro ridership). If so many aspects of life are structured by ascribed racial 
status—from prenatal medical care, to residential patterns, to educational 
opportunities, to end-of-life palliative treatment—then it is nonsensical to 
ask of a person (or aggregate units like neighborhoods) to change 
his/her/their raced status, but otherwise be the exact same person (or 
 
 113 As Heckman pointed out, we should not confuse practical problems for theoretical problems: 
“Holland’s 1986 claim that the causal effects of race or gender are meaningless conflates an empirical 
problem”—identifying parameters (causal or otherwise) from hypothetical population data—“with a 
problem of theory”—defining the set of hypotheticals or counterfactuals; “[t]he scientific approach 
sharply distinguishes these two issues. One can in theory define the effect even if one cannot identify it 
from population or sample data.” James J. Heckman, The Scientific Model of Causality, 35 SOC. 
METHODOLOGY 1, 31–32 (2005); see also Clark Glymour, Comment: Statistics and Metaphysics, 81 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 964, 964–66 (1986); Clark Glymour & Madelyn R. Glymour, Commentary: Race and 
Sex Are Causes, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 488, 489 (2014) (discussing conditions under which race and sex can 
be conceptualized as causes in a framework limiting the label to interventions or events on the unit). 
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neighborhood). It is impossible (that is, illogical, nonsensical, improbable, 
meaningless) to ask of the person: Be the exact same unit except for race, 
but do not change anything else about yourself because I want to see the 
effect of race and race alone on an outcome (Y). 
But the thrust of the Greiner–Rubin solution is to posit this as a 
possibility in the minds of decision-makers. That is, the statistician’s solution 
requires decision-makers’ consideration of candidate units that are the exact 
same units except for race, asking that those units not change anything else 
about themselves except that one attribute so that we might isolate the effect 
of race and race alone on the decision-makers’ assignment of an outcome 
(Y). This solution requires us to accept that there is such a thing in potential 
decision-makers’ minds as unit u that is “treated” by being raced “black” that 
is conceptually an identical unit when raced “white,” except for that single 
trait. That is the narrow and precise definition of cause in the counterfactual 
model. Something cannot be a causal predicate in the counterfactual 
framework if  
we cannot coherently describe what it would be like for the relevant intervention 
to occur at all or for which there is no conceivable basis for assessing claims 
about what would happen under such interventions because we have no basis 
for disentangling, even conceptually, the effects of changing the cause variable 
alone from the effects of other sorts of changes that accompany changes in the 
cause variable.114 
What sort of thing is “race” under the thought experiment that imagines 
decision-makers could perceive identical units that differ only in the 
treatment of racial status?115 I submit the only way to get that thought 
 
 114 WOODWARD, supra note 95, at 132. As I will argue below, this issue is fatal for any attempt to 
identify discrimination with the treatment effect of race because we require sociological knowledge of 
what sorts of things have different cultural or social meanings by group status despite being formally 
identical, and we require a moral theory for what sorts of things are fair or just to vary given the prior. 
 115 A recent paper by Sen and Wasow suggests that the problems of causal inference with respect to 
race can be fruitfully addressed by conceptualizing race as a “bundle of sticks,” which would be 
“operationalized as a disaggregable composite variable rather than a monolithic, homogenous entity, 
[and] the problem of manipulability can be resolved by identifying an element of race that is [both] 
relevant to the research question at hand and [that] can be manipulated in at least one of two ways,” either 
by selecting auditors “from different racial categories,” or by changing “traits that are highly collinear 
with race and mutable [which] are often well suited to causal inference” such as name, neighborhood, or 
dialect. Sen & Wasow, supra note 97, at 506–08. They argue this “approach resolves the conflict between 
the potential outcomes framework of causal inference and seemingly immutable characteristics such as 
race, gender and sexual orientation.” Id. at 500–01. VanderWeele and Robinson, supra note 93, at 477, 
suggest a related way of interpreting the race coefficient in a proffered analysis that would regress some 
measure of, say, health outcomes on socioeconomic status (SES) and race, saying that 
the coefficient for black race in the regression could be interpreted as the health inequality that 
would remain between blacks and whites if the family and neighborhood SES distributions . . . of 
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experiment off the ground is to conceptualize race as only a signifier stripped 
of all of its accreted meanings, as something like freckles or bunions that is 
just the bodily property. On this account, race is an individual-level physical 
attribute, and decision-makers have the capacity to identify the treatment of 
racial status by perceiving the attribute without triggering the social 
meanings (as opposed to mere affectual distaste) that make it a culturally 
salient category (in contrast to freckles, which can be identified by 
designating small dots on a person’s face without deeper relevant cultural 
literacy). My claim is that such an account of race as a treatment is 
incompatible with the constructivist account of race because race is a system 
of social meanings, not an individual-level attribute.116 
An analogy to other things that are not profitably conceptualized as 
treatments in the counterfactual framework might be helpful. Imagine one 
wants to understand how the treatment of GERMAN versus URUGUAY on the 
units of nation-states affects some outcome Y measurable at the level of the 
nation-state. What does it mean to think of types of COUNTRINESS as causes 
in the counterfactual sense? How does one pick out that thing that is 
distinctly THE-TREATMENT and separate it from the set of things that can 
conceptually be identified as NOT-THE-TREATMENT? How would one isolate 
GERMAN versus URUGUAY from its confounders, by stripping away history, 
institutional structure, culture, language, and so much more to get to the core 
of GERMANNESS or URUGUAYNESS? Such a thought experiment takes us 
away from the real social entities that we are trying to understand and seems 
to misrepresent the way that country-specificity has causal properties. One 
could create typologies of nation-states and formalize certain qualitative 
differences and similarities among them to understand why Y levels work 
out differently in different clusters of, say, resource endowments, political 
histories, or institutional configurations. But that is a very different exercise 
from isolating the causal effect of COUNTRINESS, which requires that there 
be such a thing as COUNTRINESS that is distinct and apart from NON- 
COUNTRINESS and the latter needs to be stripped away to get at the core 
 
the black population were set equal to that of the white population (e.g., by setting SES for each 
black person to levels randomly chosen from the white SES distribution). 
The bundle of sticks metaphor suggests that the causal properties of the constituted category would remain 
invariant to individual manipulations to its constitutive elements; but if the category has the meaning and 
causal properties it has because of its constitutive parts and their organization, then such an assumption 
would not hold. The theoretical objection to the VanderWeele and Robinson approach is similar: Why 
would we assume that the relationship between health outcomes and the social categories of BLACK and 
WHITE would be the same in a world in which family and neighborhood SES distributions were radically 
changed from what they are in our current world? 
 116 Another way of thinking about the objection is that we need a theory of what constitutes THE-
TREATMENT in order to separate it from things that are NOT-THE-TREATMENT. 
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treatment so we can construct otherwise identical units that differ only 
between GERMANNESS and URUGUAYNESS, but nothing else. Certainly, one 
can proffer GERMANNESS or URUGUAYNESS as an explanans for the 
explanandum of variation in Y, but I would assert that when we do so we are 
similarly offering a constitutive explanation—referencing the things of 
which the nation-states of Germany and Uruguay consist to explicate why 
such a constellation make it possible for Y to vary in the way it does. 
Decision-makers do not perceive neutral units as bearers of credentials 
or decision-relevant variables that are then painted over with a racial status 
any more than they perceive nation-states as neutral units of political 
territory painted over with flavors of countriness. If we accept that race is 
such a salient vector of social life that it is incoherent to conceptualize the 
causal effect of race by asking a person to be the exact same person but for 
race at a particular moment in time, then it is similarly incoherent to 
conceptualize the causal effect of race by imagining decision-makers to 
perceive two candidates as otherwise identical but for race for similar 
reasons. The catch in the thought experiment is not biology making race 
“immutable,” but history, economics, and sociology making race a 
fundamental structuring category of thought, perception, action, and 
experience in the United States. 
Of course, we can present decision-makers with candidates of varied 
racial statuses that look similarly situated with respect to formal credentials. 
We can even present decision-makers with two candidates defined by vectors 
of qualifications that represent an exhaustive list of every possible variable 
that could conceivably be rationally relevant to the decision in question, but 
that differ by racial signifiers. 
What sort of information is generated by such an exercise and how does 
it help us identify discrimination? I begin, naturally, with Eddie Murphy. 
IV. EDDIE MURPHY AND THE EXPERIMENTAL IDEAL 
In 1984, Eddie Murphy pioneered the field of audit studies, and 
researchers have been trying to replicate his genius ever since.117 After 
applying white face makeup, watching a lot of Dynasty, and reading copious 
Hallmark cards, Eddie Murphy emerged in New York City as Mr. White. In 
his new racial identity, Murphy-as-White was gifted a free newspaper in a 
bodega, treated to a musical drinking party on a public bus after the last black 
 
 117 Just kidding—there were audit studies prior to 1984 (for example, the classic correspondence 
study: Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133, 
134 (1962)). However, there is no question that none have matched the genius of that 1984 Saturday 
Night Live skit “White Like Me.” NBC.COM, Watch Saturday Night Live Highlight: White Like Me, 
http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/white-like-me/n9308 [https://perma.cc/VTF7-WBQD]. 
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man disembarked, and—with no collateral, no credit, and no ID—
effortlessly procured a loan of $50,000 from a bank with assurances from the 
white banker that he did not really need to pay it back. 
The classic audit study design mixes the randomization of clinical 
experimental design with real-world conditions by staging randomized 
encounters to generate the outcome of interest from actual decision-makers 
in the field.118 One often hears the claim that randomized experiments are the 
“gold standard” for causal inference because randomization eliminates 
selection-into-treatment bias. The strength of randomized studies is internal 
validity, which refers to the confidence one can have in the estimate of the 
treatment effect within the sample studied. But their weakness is external 
validity, which refers to the confidence one can have that the treatment effect 
estimated from the study sample can be extrapolated to the general 
population of interest. It requires strong assumptions to infer that the 
treatment effect estimated from a controlled randomized study generalizes to 
the larger population.119 In audit studies, the researcher tries to select auditors 
that are as closely matched as possible on relevant dimensions and differ 
only by race (or ethnicity, sex, etc.), who are then trained to go into a 
particular encounter in an identical fashion to solicit the decision-makers’ 
reactions to specific prompts. Correspondence studies mimic this design 
without live testers by using identical résumés or applications to solicit the 
decision-makers’ outcome and signaling the category of difference (race, 
ethnicity, sex) either explicitly or implicitly. 
For example, Devah Pager’s well-known study of race and criminal 
record discrimination—first conducted in Milwaukee and replicated in New 
York City—was designed to present employers with similarly qualified job 
applicants who differed by race and felony drug conviction. The Milwaukee 
study enrolled college students as auditors, who were “matched on the basis 
of age, race, physical appearance, and general style of self-presentation” and 
were also assigned “fictitious résumés that reflected equivalent levels of 
education and work experience.”120 In Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman’s 
 
 118 “While retaining the key experimental features of matching and random assignment important for 
inferences of causality, this approach relies on real contexts (e.g., actual employment searches, real estate 
markets, consumer transactions) for its staged measurement techniques.” DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: 
RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 48–49 (2007). 
 119 See CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION AND DECISION 226–27 (2007). The 
tension among the extent of assumptions, the confidence in the deduction, and the scope of applicability 
of that deduction has been widely discussed. One notable formulation is Manski’s Law of Decreasing 
Credibility: “The credibility of inference decreases with the strength of the assumptions maintained.” Id. 
at 3. As he argues, “[t]his principle implies that empirical researchers face a dilemma as they decide what 
assumptions to maintain. Stronger assumptions yield inferences that may be tighter but less credible. 
Methodological research cannot resolve this dilemma but can clarify its nature.” Id. 
 120 See PAGER, supra note 118, at 59. 
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classic study of discrimination in bargaining for new cars, the auditors were 
chosen within a narrow age range (twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age), 
education (three to four years of postsecondary education), attractiveness 
(“testers were subjectively chosen to have average attractiveness”), wore 
similar “yuppie” clothing, and “drove to the dealership in similar rented 
cars.”121 The auditors were also given careful training and instructions so that 
they would approach the car dealers in the same way and systematically 
bargain in the same manner; a “script governed both the verbal and nonverbal 
behavior of the testers.”122 Other well-known correspondence and audit 
studies include in-person consultations and sending identical credentials on 
résumés mailed to job openings with different racialized sounding names 
(white-associated names such as Emily Walsh or Greg Baker, or African-
American-associated names such as Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones).123 
One might think that the audit study is the methodological incarnation 
of the statistician’s solution of conceptualizing race as a cause-qua-
treatment. The object of causal inference is the decision-maker; the 
researcher can design auditors to present a set of identical credentials; and 
the treatment signals the racial status of candidates. At the risk of being 
repetitive, audit studies are important and valuable. But they are not a clean 
methodological solution to messy questions about what racial discrimination 
is and how we ought to detect it. 
The following Sections make three related conceptual points. First, 
audit studies do not measure the objectively bounded treatment effect of race 
and race alone, stripped of all other confounding traits, meanings, 
characteristics, or variables, on decision-makers’ determinations of an 
outcome of interest. Second, the results of audit studies are recognizable as 
evidence of discrimination by virtue of constitutive explanations that ground 
thick ethical evaluations. It is not because the study design has isolated the 
treatment effect of race (or ethnicity, or sex, etc.), but because the design 
instantiates moral intuitions that—given what the different social categories 
are—members of the respective groups ought to elicit the same outcomes 
 
 121 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305–06 (1995). 
 122 Id. at 306. 
 123 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 
(2004); Judith D. Feins & Rachel G. Bratt, Barred in Boston: Racial Discrimination in Housing, 49 J. 
AM. PLANNING ASS’N 344 (1983); Stephen L. Ross, Appendix A: Paired Testing and the 2000 Housing 
Discrimination Survey, in ANGELA WILLIAMS FOSTER ET AL., MEASURING HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
IN A NATIONAL STUDY: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 49, 49–66 (2002), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/10311/chapter/9 [https://perma.cc/ZRA4-LN4U]; John Yinger, Evidence on 
Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 33 (1998); John Yinger, Measuring Racial 
Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881, 883 (1986). 
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when they present in the manner in which the study manufactures. The 
results are often recognized as such compelling evidence because study 
design frequently instantiates widely held—yet often quite minimal—moral 
intuitions about how groups ought to be treated given what differences and 
meanings constitute their status. Third, semi-experimental (or experimental 
for that matter) methods are not the “gold standard” for detecting 
discrimination against which all other means should be measured. In the 
context of certain forms of discrimination, these methods might often be 
inappropriate. 
A. Solid State Race 
Audit studies do not measure the objective-isolated treatment effect of 
race and race alone. This is not because researchers have failed to design and 
execute the methodology with rigor or precision. Audit studies do not 
measure the objective-isolated treatment effect of race and race alone 
because there is no such thing to measure. 
If one accepts the constructivist account of race, then the signifiers used 
to signal treatment into a racial category for auditors inflect the very 
meanings and substantive relevance of other decision-relevant credentials 
because that’s what race is: it is a system of social meaning wherein 
particular cultural cues indicate the stratifying social types operative in a 
particular place and time. The constructivist would insist that the treatment 
presented in audit and correspondence studies is not substantively identical 
candidates that differ only by racial status, but rather differently raced 
candidates bearing whatever set of formally similar credentials the 
researcher gives them. Before further explaining what I take audit studies to 
be detecting, I want to make a few points about what audit studies represent 
by thinking through their actual design, execution, and interpretation. 
First, there is no way to even design a study attempting to present 
decision-makers with similarly situated candidates that differ by race without 
thick cultural knowledge about the social meaning of traits and credentials 
in a particular place and time, or without making substantive value 
judgments about the fair grounds for decision-making in a particular arena 
given our knowledge of how these categories are constituted. Second, 
presenting decision-makers with candidates signaling different racial status 
and an identical set of credentials does not mean that decision-makers 
perceive identical units but for the treatment if the very meanings of the 
credentials are inflected by the racial status. These credentials do not 
necessarily mean the same thing for purposes of interpreting an action as 
discriminatory just because they are identically proffered. That is, if the 
social categories of race and ethnicity are constituted by systematic 
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differentiation over some set of important social, economic, and cultural 
factors, then signaling different membership changes the meaning of other 
decision-relevant traits or credentials. 
Most audit studies proceed by trying to make all factors about the 
auditors that might be theoretically relevant to the decision-maker’s decision 
identical. Imagine that the ideal experiment would have an exhaustive list of 
all credentials that would be instrumentally rational to consider in the 
decision of interest. The researcher could then set those credentials to be the 
same between the two candidate auditors selected to signal different raced 
statuses. But the researcher cannot just use credentials to signal the relevant 
variables if what she is trying to do is make candidates substantively identical 
because formally identical credentials are interpreted differently with 
differently raced candidates precisely because of the social fact of race. 
For instance, say a researcher wants to signal equal educational 
attainment of a black and white auditor. She could list a high school diploma 
on the résumé for each auditor. But the history of racial segregation and state 
neglect of black schools has created large differences in the mean quality of 
schools between white and black neighborhoods in most major cities, so a 
decision-maker might treat the high school diploma signal differently for a 
black and white auditor based on this knowledge or presumption. Or is the 
right way to set up a study design to have a black student with a high school 
diploma from a well-known and predominantly white high school? Would 
that design trigger the types of assumptions Justice Clarence Thomas 
famously frets about with regard to affirmative action?124 Or is the race-
neutral way of proffering the credential for the high school diploma to be 
from a racially integrated high school? What does that mean if only a tiny 
percentage of the city’s schools are racially integrated or if education is 
stratified within schools? Or should the researcher include the score of some 
so-called skill or aptitude test? Is that a race-neutral way of signaling 
capacity when the tests measure developed abilities, which systematically 
differ by environments, the very environments that systematically differ by 
 
 124 Dissenting from the majority opinion upholding University of Michigan Law School’s 
consideration of race in admissions, Justice Thomas argued: 
As admission prospects approach certainty, there is no incentive for the black applicant to 
continue to prepare for the LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score. 
It is far from certain that the LSAT test-taker’s behavior is responsive to the Law School’s 
admissions policies. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that this racial discrimination will help 
fulfill the bigot’s prophecy about black underperformance—just as it confirms the conspiracy 
theorist’s belief that “institutional racism” is at fault for every racial disparity in our society. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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race?125 Even if the researcher arranges for all relevant observable factors to 
look nominally equal, testers can vary on “unobservables,” those soft skills 
or interactional tendencies that make people just seem different.126 So, in 
order to really accomplish substantive equality in all theoretically decision-
relevant variables between candidate units, the auditor must know (1) the 
way in which the history and social practice of race structures access to 
qualifications and credentials, and (2) the content of cultural stereotypes by 
which racial status fills in meanings of various proxies of qualifications or 
instrumentally rational variables. 
The point is not that a researcher cannot make reasoned judgment calls 
and defend them, though those defenses can only be advanced in sociological 
and normative terms. The point is that there is no race-neutral way of 
proffering credentials because we live in a racially stratified society. When 
one tries to think about how to construct identical candidates that differ only 
by race, one realizes it is a lot of work to strip away all of the NOT-THE-
TREATMENT in order to get at the thing that is THE-TREATMENT because race 
is such a fundamental structuring category of social life, thought, and 
experience in America. 
If one follows the logic of constructing substantively identical auditors 
but for race all the way down, the exercise becomes one of experimentally 
unmaking the social consequences of a racial order in a particular encounter. 
But the map to unmake the consequences of entrenched racial systems can 
only come from thick sociological and historical knowledge about how race 
patterns life chances and creates meanings. It can only come from situated 
social understanding about the complex system of meanings and practices 
that constitutes the very categories. The ideal experiment to detect 
discrimination in the counterfactual causal model is one in which the 
researcher uses this map to select credentials that zero out the average 
differences in relevant variables that were produced by the real lived 
institutions of racial orders, and that signal to the decision-maker that the 
assumptions or valuations she might assign to formal credentials drawing on 
 
 125 See Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 55, 55–
85 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (discussing the various forms of bias that are 
implicated by relying on so-called aptitude tests, including labeling and content bias, which misattributes 
the measurement object to purely innate intelligence instead of environmental factors supporting 
development or uses measurement techniques that systematically favor one group, or prediction bias, 
which refers to the fact that similar scores do not predict valued outcomes (i.e., grades, job performance) 
similarly between groups because of other systematic differences). 
 126 James Heckman, among others, has long criticized audit studies for failing to consider the role of 
different variances between groups on characteristics unobservable to the researcher but observable to 
the potential decision-maker. See James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 
108–11 (1998). 
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cultural stereotypes are inapplicable to the given case. Remember: the 
definition of a treatment in the counterfactual model requires an isolated 
nonbacktracking manipulation on a unit that can be applied without 
transforming the unit into a different unit. Unless the researcher is presenting 
identical candidates but for the treatment in a given encounter, she is not 
measuring the treatment effect of race alone on otherwise identical units. She 
is doing something else. 
And what have we gotten at after we have followed that map all the way 
down in this ideal thought experiment of constructing substantively identical 
auditors but for racial difference? My sense is the standard assumption is that 
at base what you hit is the brute fact of racial difference, which must mean 
the signifiers of racial status—e.g., “just” skin color, phenotype, or some 
other physical difference between bodies—stripped of all of the effects they 
produced in the social world prior to that encounter and bundled with a note 
to the decision-maker that any of the negative (or positive) signified 
meanings that have been attached to those signifiers are not true in this 
instance. And my sense is that many people have understood the legal refrain 
of “invidious discrimination” (or “taste-based discrimination”) to mean 
precisely this—someone acting out of affectual distaste for the brute 
signifiers of race. 
But conceptualizing this as the ideal thought experiment for detecting 
discrimination—looking for indications that a decision-maker has acted on 
mere affectual distaste for the brute signifiers of race—unmoors the exercise 
from both a sociologically coherent theory of race and an ethically sound 
theory for why the coercive powers of the state should be dedicated to 
detecting it and rooting it out. There is no public reason—worthy of 
constitutional amendments, federal and state legislation, various 
administrative agencies, and extensive public resources—to be concerned 
with individual-level dislike of certain physical attributes unless we have a 
theory about how social processes have constructed those signifiers as 
systemically disfavored through persistent material and symbolic processes 
and a theory about why that is wrong. 
B. How Audit Studies Demonstrate Discrimination 
In thinking through what audit studies are trying to get at, we need to 
remember that there is a difference between discrimination and irrationality 
or idiosyncratic tastes. Saying that a decision-maker undertook a course of 
action because a candidate was perceived to be white means something 
different than saying a decision-maker undertook a course of action because 
a candidate was perceived to have freckles. The former references a social 
category as the reason for action; the latter references speckles of melanin 
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on the epidermis. When we say “Eddie Murphy got a free newspaper because 
he was white,” “white” is essentially a metonym for a constellation of social 
meanings produced through a complex history of slavery, immigration, and 
countless other forces, not a melanin deficit (or white face makeup in his 
case).127 The signifiers of racial status cannot appear (to cultural insiders) as 
random aspects of physicality like freckles, about which people might have 
thin personal preferences or affectual responses. If signifiers of racial status 
could appear to cultural insiders as random aspects of physicality, then it 
would be quite mysterious why those markers of physicality predict other 
valuable social and economic resources.128 And there certainly would be no 
moral grounds, distinct from a commitment to functional rationality or 
efficiency, to prohibit public and private actors from acting on their 
preferences for certain signifiers of racial status. 
For these reasons, I insist that racial discrimination is a thick ethical 
concept that rests on an account of the system of social meanings that 
constitute race and a normative theory for why (and when) decisions that are 
based on those social meanings are worthy of moral concern. There is no 
reason above and beyond opposition to idiosyncratic aversions, irrationality, 
random meanness, or a general opposition to the structure of disadvantages 
(as opposed to whom and how they are allocated) to care about a decision-
maker denying an opportunity or imposing a cost on a freckled candidate.129 
But there is a reason above and beyond opposition to idiosyncratic aversions, 
irrationality, or a general opposition to the structure of disadvantages to care 
about a decision-maker denying an opportunity or imposing a cost on a black 
candidate.130 I believe that the sociological facts that explain why race is 
 
 127 “Because the system of slavery was contingent on and conflated with racial identity, it became 
crucial to be ‘white,’ to be identified as white, to have the property of being white. Whiteness was the 
characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings.” Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1993). 
 128 Without getting dragged into another large debate, I will say that the same critiques offered here 
can be applied to “taste-based” discrimination, which defines discrimination as essentially a random 
aversion or irrational prejudice that a person is willing to expend resources to indulge: “[I]f someone has 
a ‘taste for discrimination,’ he must act as if he were willing to forfeit income in order to avoid certain 
transactions . . . .” BECKER, supra note 28, at 16. A police officer may dislike people with freckles. And 
he might even be motivated to make an otherwise marginal arrest because he hates people with freckles 
so much. But having “preferences” for nonfreckled people is a fundamentally different sort of disposition 
than a “preference” for nonblack people. A police officer can have thin preferences about freckles (just 
hating the way they look), but not about the signifiers of blackness because those signifiers signify a much 
deeper and wider set of social meanings. 
 129 See Post, supra note 30, at 15, 20 (discussing the trope of colorblindness in antidiscrimination 
law as being an admonishment to be “instrumentally rational”). 
 130 I understand critiques of racialized liberalism to be making a similar point: that we cannot define 
distributive justice as such without engaging how liberalism is itself premised on a racial order. See 
MILLS, supra note 27, at 208–09. 
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different from freckles are necessary to make sense of why the moral concern 
with the signifiers of racial status being a source of disadvantage is distinct 
from that of freckles. Essentially, the constructivist account of racial group 
formation is the source for both: by identifying the historical and social 
processes by which racial groups are constituted and maintained as 
categories of stratification and domination, we identify the processes and 
meanings we want to transform so that they no longer operate as categories 
of stratification and domination. 
Therefore, in my view, audit studies can provide evidence of 
discrimination not by virtue of identifying a treatment effect, but by virtue 
of providing evidence of a constitutive claim that grounds a thick ethical 
evaluation. Furthermore, they are often recognized as providing strong 
evidence of discrimination not because of clean methodological rigor, but 
rather because of the widely shared moral intuitions—often quite minimal—
that are instantiated in most designs. 
Let’s return to Eddie Murphy and his perfect audit study. He goes into 
the bodega as Mr. White and gets the free newspaper. He goes in as black 
Eddie Murphy and he is made to pay for the newspaper (let us assume other 
things about his dress, speech, and affect are the same). The counterfactual 
is true: Eddie Murphy not in whiteface and otherwise the same had to pay 
for the newspaper. But that counterfactual is not what identifies the action as 
discrimination.131 What identifies the bodega worker’s action as 
discrimination is that we reason about its distinctive wrongfulness only by 
referencing what constitutes BLACKNESS versus WHITENESS. We can only 
characterize the action as distinctly discriminatory—as opposed to random, 
irrational, or just an expression of idiosyncratic preferences of the bodega 
worker—by relying on our prior social and cultural understandings about 
what the categories of black and white are, what they mean, in what 
meanings they consist, etc. The thick moral claim—the label of 
DISCRIMINATION—is grounded in a constitutive explanation, answering 
 
 131 Certainly, there are many instances where someone might grant that the counterfactual is true but 
think that the label of discrimination is not appropriate. Take, for example, the admissions policies at 
issue for applicants in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, where the plaintiffs’ expert reasons 
in explicit counterfactual terms that race “caused” a differential probability of admission.  
An Asian-American applicant who was male, who was not disadvantaged, and whose 
characteristics result in a 25% chance of admission would have more than a 36% chance of 
admission if treated as a white applicant; more than a 75% chance of admission if treated as a 
Hispanic applicant; and more than a 95% chance of admission if treated as an African-American 
applicant (with all other characteristics unchanged). 
Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 7, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, 2017 WL 
10442564 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 14-cv-14176 ADB). Granting, for the purposes of argument, that there 
is a differential likelihood of admission among groups conditional on some set of academic measures 
does not answer the normative question of whether it identifies a discriminatory wrong. 
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questions such as “In virtue of what about the categories of BLACKNESS and 
WHITENESS can we understand this action to act on or rely upon that makes 
us want to disavow it?” or “Did the dispositional properties of this social 
category we know of as RACE make this act wrongful?” 
The reason that most of us recognize results from audit studies showing 
differential treatment by decision-makers of differently raced candidates is 
because there is widespread agreement that differently raced persons with 
the specific credentials presented in the study ought to be treated similarly, 
not because proffering some discrete list of identical credentials or dress 
somehow makes the candidates “identical persons” except for this trait called 
“race.” 
Consider another example concerning the category of sex: if we send 
out a male and female auditor to apply for jobs carrying identical résumés 
and dressed in identical skirts, they are not identical candidates but for sex. 
They are differently sexed candidates (as signaled with recognizable cues for 
culturally presumed SEX binaries) that have the same résumé wearing the 
same skirt. The existence of the category SEX makes the same skirt mean 
something different for purposes of deciding if differential treatment is 
discriminatory; and we only know that because we have prior sociological 
knowledge about what SEX references in this place and time. Whether or not 
one interprets results showing a lower job-offer rate to the male auditor-
candidate as evidence of sex discrimination in hiring turns on what one 
thinks is fair to expect in workplaces given that the category of SEX in our 
society currently is one in which differently sexed bodies with different 
(presumed) primary or secondary sex characteristics are expected to wear 
different types of attire. Furthermore, a position that we ought to recognize 
a lower job-offer rate to the male auditor-candidate as discrimination would 
be based on sociological and normative arguments advancing that, if we 
change what sorts of attire differently sexed bodies are expected to wear in 
workplaces, then we will transform the very meanings of sex in our society 
to be categorically less capable of producing oppression and inequality. The 
precondition to applying a thick ethical evaluation of discrimination to the 
results of an audit study is a moral position on what people are owed given 
what the category is, not some formal standard of equality that can be 
articulated without understanding what race or sex is in this time and place. 
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C. Gold Standards 
As philosophers, criminologists, statisticians, and many others have 
pointed out, there is no a priori gold standard method.132 Methods must fit 
questions. The selection of methods should be driven by careful and rigorous 
thinking about precisely what type of question we are asking, and explicit 
reckoning with a theoretical framework that specifies the social categories 
and processes at work. Several aspects of police and prosecutorial 
discrimination cases make audit studies an inappropriate gold standard, 
including the conceptual problems explained in the prior Sections, the 
complex organizational structures of police departments and prosecutors’ 
offices, and the problems of external validity. Similar issues could be raised 
in other discrimination contexts, such as the complex organizational 
structures of large corporations or universities. 
First, the conduct alleged to be unlawful in most police or prosecutorial 
discrimination cases cannot be analyzed at the individual level or even at a 
single level of interaction. Police departments and prosecutors’ offices are 
large and complex organizations. Massive racial or ethnic disparities of the 
type alleged in Floyd or Johnson,133 for example, are not the result of 
individual-level racist dispositions of beat cops or line prosecutors. Or rather, 
they are rarely explainable only by reference to individual-level racist 
dispositions of beat cops or line prosecutors. Explaining those disparities 
requires understanding how certain responses to problems and actions 
become conceivable; how observed patterns of outcomes emerge from the 
organizational hierarchy of the police department or prosecutor’s office; how 
enforcement decisions are made; who issues directives; how internal rules 
are enforced or not enforced; how incentives of different actors at various 
levels of the organizational hierarchy are shaped; and how all of these factors 
interact. 
There are some 36,000 officers within the NYPD134 allocated between 
many hierarchical and vertical levels of the organization.135 Which level 
would be the right unit to take as the decision-maker for purposes of 
 
 132  CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 36–
38 (2013); Cartwright, supra note 101, at 11; Sampson, supra note 105, at 496. 
 133 See supra notes 63–66, 81, and accompanying text for an earlier discussion of Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and supra notes 1–6, 107 for an earlier discussion of 
United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 308 (M.D.N.C. 2015). 
 134 About NYPD, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-
landing.page [https://perma.cc/8KNY-PNRH]. 
 135 Bureaus, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/bureaus.page [https://perma.cc/ 
NW2J-4L73] (listing twenty-two of the organization’s bureaus and explaining that “[e]ach bureau is 
headed by a chief or deputy commissioner who is appointed by the Police Commissioner and oversees 
the numerous functions of his or her divisions, units, and squads”). 
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detecting discrimination in the counterfactual model? The plaintiffs in the 
Floyd case did not set out to show that the hundreds of thousands of stops of 
black and Latino residents resulted from the psychological dispositions of 
beat cops. Some of the plaintiffs’ most compelling evidence was about the 
multifaceted interactions among various levels of the organization, such as 
how allocation decisions were made, how stop-and-frisk numbers were used 
as a performance metric for both beat cops and precinct commanders, and 
the pressures created at different levels of the organization to demonstrate 
productivity. The outcomes at issue in the Floyd case were produced by the 
complex interaction of allocation decisions, tactical decisions, incentives and 
directives at various levels of the organization, and beliefs and intentions at 
various levels of the hierarchy. Looking for racial discrimination as the 
treatment effect of race on discrete decision-making units at a single level of 
activity would be a deeply theoretically misguided way to determine whether 
outcomes that are produced in an interactive fashion through many layers of 
organizational directives, incentives, and discretion are discriminatory. 
Police allocation decisions, for example, can never be modeled in the 
way suggested by the statistician’s solution. If a court wants to know if race 
“caused”—in the counterfactual sense—more police to be allocated to a 
certain neighborhood, a sting operation to be sited in a particular community, 
or prosecutors to choose specific confidential informants (CIs) to make new 
conspiracy cases, it is impossible to do so utilizing the Greiner–Rubin 
solution. There is no time at which we could imagine the relevant decision-
makers not perceiving the racial composition of the neighborhood, 
community, or the race or ethnicity of their CIs. Actors in the organizational 
hierarchy making tactical and allocation decisions are always doing so with 
full knowledge of the racial compositions of the geographic spaces to which 
they are allocating officers and directing specific tactics. In addition, in many 
jurisdictions the history of racial and ethnic segregation makes it impossible 
to find counterfactual units comparable along relevant vectors.136 We are 
back to problems posed by the temporality of treatment issue discussed in 
Part II because all relevant decisions are posttreatment. Nor are perceptions 
 
 136 Even perception of seemingly objective conditions like physical disorder are fundamentally 
structured by racial and ethnic understandings, meaning it is not clear what exactly it would mean to say 
two racially distinct neighborhoods are identical except for demographic composition. See Robert J. 
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social 
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (showing that “social structure,” 
namely racial composition, “proved a more powerful predictor of perceived disorder than did carefully 
observed disorder”). Furthermore, a city might have a few integrated neighborhoods or police precincts, 
but often the majority of the outcomes of concern are happening in segregated spaces. Therefore, taking 
integrated spaces as the benchmark for nondiscriminatory outcomes is deeply problematic because it 
assumes raced units will be treated the same in homogenous and heterogeneous spaces. 
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of crime conditions—even devoid of any explicit race descriptors—“race-
neutral” input; the very conception of what sorts of social problems are 
assigned to the penal arm of the state is itself deeply racialized, and 
seemingly neutral designations transmit racial meaning.137 
Finally, the very strengths of methods with strong internal validity are 
weaknesses when trying to generalize the relevance of the findings beyond 
the controlled parameters of the study design. Randomized clinical trials, for 
example—the method typically touted as the gold standard for making causal 
inferences of the counterfactual variety—provide strong evidence of very 
narrow claims.138 The reliability of the conclusions of audit studies is 
similarly dependent upon the ability of the researcher to practically realize 
all of the requirements laid out in Part III, which in extremely simple terms 
demand that the candidate units have been made exactly the same but for the 
designated treatment. But a court evaluating an allegation of police or 
prosecutorial discrimination is not just concerned with internal validity, 
whether the treatment effect estimated is biased for the study population. A 
court must also be concerned with external validity, such as whether the 
causal claims supported by the study are generalizable to larger populations. 
For all of the “vanity of rigor” in randomized experiments, we find ourselves 
right back in the sloppy terrain of expert judgment, past experience, and 
reasoned qualitative discussion to decide if and to what extent the study’s 
findings are representative of the causal structure in the larger world that is 
the object of our true concern.139 
Beyond internal and external validity issues, courts also must ask if the 
information generated, even if generalizable, actually captures what is at 
issue in a claim of police discrimination. Scholars addressing the relevance 
of experimental data for policy debates have used the phrase “policy 
transfer” or “contextualization” to capture the fact that narrow causal claims 
 
 137 For compelling historical documentation of how crime rates themselves were racialized from the 
start, see KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011), and for compelling psychological evidence of how the 
concept of crime triggers associations with the concept of blackness, see Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., 
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. 876, 881 (2004) 
(showing “the extent to which Black faces are brought before the footlights of attention when the concept 
of crime is activated”). 
138 [I]f all the assumptions for their correct application are met, then if evidence claims of the 
appropriate form are true, so too will the conclusions be true. But these methods are concomitantly 
narrow in scope. The assumptions necessary for their successful application will have to be 
extremely restrictive and they can take only a very specialized type of evidence as input and 
special forms of conclusion as output. That is because it takes strong premises to deduce 
interesting conclusions and strong premises tend not to be widely true. 
Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12. 
 139 Id. at 18. 
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are not directly translatable to larger policy questions.140 This is true not only 
because causal effects might differ by subpopulations, but also because 
treatments—especially scaled-up, systemwide treatments—can alter the 
very context in which they are applied by transforming how strategic, 
reflexive actors and institutions interact.141 
In sum, we should be careful not to let the apparent rigor and cleanliness 
of certain methods drive the substance of what questions are asked. There is 
no a priori reason that every question about the social world must fit into 
variable-based analysis or experimental logic, and sometimes we do violence 
to the inquiry at hand by forcing it to conform to the structure of favored 
methods that might seem like the most elegant abstraction (or the highest 
status methods). At issue in many discrimination cases is how large, 
complex, multilayered, and sometimes heterogeneous organizations have 
operated over extended periods of time and space. Audit studies, or 
regression analyses trying to reconstruct similarly situated units, might 
provide very valuable evidence of discrimination. But they certainly cannot 
“clinch” the conclusion that the suspect outcomes resulting from complex 
interactive mechanisms are or are not discrimination.142 
A final concern is a sociology-of-knowledge point. There is no question 
that quantitative evidence has an exalted position in the hierarchy of 
knowledge production because the methods are apparently value-free and 
rigorously deductive (and perhaps also because the field is dominated by 
men). Using and interpreting quantitative methods requires a measure of 
expert training, and therefore, the validity of the conclusions from the 
 
 140 Sampson, supra note 105, at 494. Another pithy way of saying it is that “a policy is not a 
treatment.” Robert J. Sampson, Christopher Winship & Carly Knight, Translating Causal Claims: 
Principles and Strategies for Policy-Relevant Criminology, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 587, 591 
(2013). Specifically, 
to recommend policy requires more than considering how a treatment would be expected to work 
across diverse locales. When one considers policy not as a randomized trial but as a change in 
institutional structure, it becomes clear that theory must be brought to bear for prediction. A policy 
is, by definition, a change in the rules of the game. As a result, “policy translation” involves both 
the problem of what happens when [a treatment is administered] and the problem of accounting 
for changes in organizational, political, or wider social structure when the treatment . . . scales up 
into official policy. 
Id.; see also James J. Heckman, Econometric Causality, 76 INT’L STAT. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (noting that a 
key question for social scientists is “[f]orecasting the impacts of interventions (constructing 
counterfactual states associated with interventions) never historically experienced to various 
environments, including their impacts in terms of well-being”). 
 141 Sampson et al., supra note 140, at 600 (“[C]ontext implies more than an unarticulated background 
or boundary against which to generalize causes and effects. To contextualize is to consider an entrenched 
causal web that intervenes and shapes every point of an unfolding causal process, dictating the nature of 
incentives, opportunities, and institutional relationships that define the policy world.”). 
 142 See Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12. 
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methods is hard to dispute without technical expertise. So, one final 
cautionary point is that discrimination cases should not become dominated 
by experts fighting in methodological terms inaccessible to other actors; with 
superior intelligence, computers, and fancy math in the form of equations 
that look like Charlie Brown cursing, experts and only experts can detect 
some force field of discrimination inaccessible to the uninitiated. At issue in 
discrimination cases is always a theory of the relevant social categories and 
a theory of fairness—both of which require engagement with social and 
ethical matters—which can become obscured behind apparently 
methodological discourse. 
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
Bertrand Russell famously admonished philosophy to abandon the 
notion of causality, alleging that it survives, “like the monarchy, only 
because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.”143 Nancy Cartwright 
responds that causal notions are essential to differentiate between effective 
and ineffective strategies.144 In the context of police and prosecutorial 
actions, we often observe an association between negative policing or case 
outcomes and the raced status of individuals or aggregations like 
neighborhoods. But in order to know what is to be done about these 
associations, we must inquire into causal relationships. 
The question of detecting discrimination could be posed in terms of 
effective strategies—What sort of causal understanding helps us to know if 
the practices at issue in a discrimination case should be changed? 
Conceptualizing race as treatment does not help us distinguish between 
effective and ineffective strategies for dismantling discrimination because it 
essentially asks what the effects of a racial signifier would be if the social 
facts of race were not what they are today in the United States. 
The ideal thought experiment that captures the treatment effect of race 
and race alone asks the following: produce for the decision-maker’s 
consideration two units with identical credentials (What if the entrenched 
systems of racial stratification were not so?) and purge the racialized 
meanings that inflect different values to similar credentials or attributes 
(What if racial identification did not actually change the way decision-
makers perceived or evaluated formally similar things about individuals or 
neighborhoods?). The question is, Does information about a causal link of 
that variety pick out practices that the Constitution prohibits? I say no 
 
 143 Bertrand Russell, On the Notion of Cause, 13 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 1 (1912). 
 144 Nancy Cartwright, Causal Laws and Effective Strategies, 13 NOÛS 419, 420 (1979). 
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because that thought experiment would produce information about a 
particular decision-maker’s idiosyncratic distaste for floating signifiers. 
I contend that the familiar refrain that defines discrimination as an 
action or practice that happens “because of race” does not identify a relation 
of counterfactual causality. Instead, it identifies a constitutive relation that 
grounds a thick moral evaluation, which means we can only identify the 
distinctive wrongfulness of the action or practice by reference to what social 
types such as BLACK, HISPANIC, or WHITE culturally reference, in what it 
consists to name someone such a type, and other ways of identifying what 
the categories are. 
To illustrate how constitutive, and not counterfactual causal, 
explanations are at work in identifying discrimination, let us return to the 
visiting anthropologist on the island nation stratified by Royals and non-
Royals. Asking about counterfactual causal dependence is just an unhelpful 
way of figuring out whether stepping off the street when Royals approach is 
properly described by a thick ethical term such as “non-Royal debasement.” 
And it is an equally unhelpful way of identifying effective strategies, namely 
what needs to be changed in order to dismantle Royal-based stratification. 
We can address those questions with constitutive explanations. One 
would need to ask how it is possible for non-Royals to feel compelled to step 
off the sidewalk by reference to the constitutive aspects of the socially 
constructed category Royal, namely by detailing the structure and content of 
the social meanings and relations that make the category what-it-is. One 
would have to ask if the fact of non-Royals deferring sidewalk access is 
conceptually or logically dependent on the very structure of the social kind 
Royal as it currently exists. Said yet another way, if a researcher were able 
to make a person on the street of this society perceive two identical walkers 
but for purple-cape-wearing and stick-carrying—and significant other 
meanings about this person’s actions, credentials, or behavior were left 
unaffected by this manipulation—then there would not be such a thing as 
ROYAL in the way this society currently knows it. There would not be a 
morally salient issue called “non-Royal debasement” to be addressed. 
The constitutive explanation grounds the thick ethical evaluation of the 
act. To interpret the act of stepping off the sidewalk as non-Royal 
debasement (or conversely, respectful Royal obedience)—as opposed to a 
spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space or expression of a 
preference for road-walking—we need access to sociological and 
anthropological knowledge about what constitutes the relevant social kinds 
in this society. And describing it as non-Royal debasement (or conversely, 
respectful royal obedience) is not merely disapproving or approving of the 
act. It is invoking a thick ethical concept, which simultaneously describes, 
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with textured, system-level information, and evaluates the object to which it 
is applied. These two facets cannot be separated because the evaluative 
aspect—the expression of judgment about the act—can only be activated 
using the descriptive component—the constellation of situated social 
meanings and cultural constructs referenced by the concept.145 
We can describe something as discrimination only if it implicates social 
meanings in a way that constitutes some social kinds as degraded or 
disfavored, over many domains and times. Race does not have effects in the 
world by triggering mere affectual dislike for random physical signifiers. In 
fact, I contend that our culture’s signifiers of racial groups are just not 
available to be the objects of thin preferences (or “tastes”) the way that other 
aspects of physicality would be, such as freckles or bunions, because of the 
history of racial group construction. And that same process that constructed 
racial categories explains why so many people seem to have the same 
affectual response to the same signifiers—why racial discrimination is a 
pervasive practice in many domains in the way that freckle or bunion 
discrimination is not. 
We can still seek to detect discrimination using audit studies, regression 
techniques with observational data, and many of the same methods folks 
have long used in social science and legal challenges. But we should be very 
clear what we are doing with those methods. The argument I have advanced 
in the preceding 29,807 words is that what we are not doing with those 
methods is detecting the treatment effect of race in the counterfactual causal 
sense. 
Other careful thinkers committed to the counterfactual causal definition 
of discrimination have thoughtfully engaged questions regarding the design 
and interpretation of quantitative measures of discrimination, arguing that 
researchers ought to be both reflective and explicit about which variables are 
included and excluded when trying to isolate the causal effect of race.146 But 
central to all counterfactual causal accounts of racial discrimination is the 
notion that there is a solid state race in units (individuals, neighborhoods, 
 
 145 The valuation is fundamentally structured by and premised upon a socially and culturally 
conditioned set of understandings. Thus, the normative component is only accessible to those with the 
linguistic and cultural competencies to decode the factual descriptive component in its social context. 
Abend, supra note 21, at 148. 
 146 Starr, supra note 99, at 32–33; Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 775. Ian Ayres and Jonathan 
Borowsky criticize the inclusion of individual police officer characteristics as an illegitimate explanation 
for racial disparities in policing and warn of “included variable bias.” IAN AYRES & JONATHAN 
BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
13 (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/racial-profiling-lapd-study-racially-disparate-outcomes-los-
angeles-police-department [https://perma.cc/R5XU-2EMQ] (report prepared for ACLU of Southern 
California). 
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etc.), an objective fact about the units that can be isolated after stripping away 
all confounders. For something to be a treatment, there must be a way to pick 
out what THE-TREATMENT is—distinct and apart from all of the things that 
are NOT-THE-TREATMENT so that we are sure we are talking about identical 
units that differ only on the-treatment. If we cannot pick apart THE-
TREATMENT from NOT-THE-TREATMENT, then we are not estimating a 
treatment effect of race and race alone when we compare the outcomes of 
candidates with some list of similar credentials and signals for different 
racial categories. We are doing something else. 
I believe that what we are doing with both observational and audit 
studies of discrimination is building a case, collecting evidence to support 
that case, and otherwise “vouching” for a particular constitutive claim with 
moral dimensions: that a specific action, practice, or policy is possible 
because of the social fact of race (or ethnicity) in a manner that implicates 
constitutive aspects of the category that we would like to change.147 Because 
racial discrimination is a thick ethical concept, the way we figure out if a 
specific action, practice, or policy is possible because of the social fact of 
race is inextricably intertwined with the grounds for the moral evaluation of 
whether or not it ought to be tolerated.148 
An implication of my argument is that the disparate treatment versus 
disparate impact binary, so central to so much of antidiscrimination law and 
literature, is not a tenable distinction along the lines it has often been 
advanced. We cannot define the former as an outcome caused by race (or 
where race was a substantial motivating factor, or other “close enough” 
formulations) and the latter as an outcome caused by a facially neutral 
consideration that just happens to affect racial groups unequally. 
I just do not see any difference between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment that can be gotten at with value-free notions of counterfactual 
causality, much less a distinction between classification on the basis of race 
as such in contrast to race-neutral factors that just happen to produce 
dissimilar racial impacts. Disparate treatment is often distinguished from 
disparate impact with reference to intentional discrimination, but 
 
 147 Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12.  
Methods [that vouch] are more wide-ranging but it cannot be proved that the conclusion is assured 
by the evidence, either because the method cannot be laid out in a way that lends itself to such a 
proof or because, by lights of the method itself, the evidence is symptomatic of the conclusion but 
not sufficient for it. 
Id. 
 148 Constitutive claims must also “support a counterfactual claim of necessity, namely that in the 
absence of the structures to which we are appealing the properties in question would not exist. But the 
kind of necessity required here is conceptual or logical, not causal or natural.” Alexander Wendt, On 
Constitution and Causation in International Relations, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 101, 105–06 (1998). 
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the explanandum (discrimination) in the explanans (discriminatory intent) is 
not saved by reference to intent or motive (to discriminate) because the point 
of the explanatory endeavor is to specify which sort of purposive 
differentiating practices are discriminatory and which sort are permissible.  
Furthermore, it is not clear why reliance on constitutive elements of a 
category (black-boxing how we determine in what those consist) can be 
coherently referenced as “race neutral” for purposes of deciding if use of 
such element is discriminatory. Calling these “race neutral” is coherent if 
one subscribes to a biological conception of race, in which the category 
consists in sharing some genetic or biological facts (but, as argued 
extensively above, then we have another problem, which is explaining why 
we need to super-size scrutiny when the state classifies on the basis of those 
facts).149 But if one subscribes to the constructivist theory of race, one must 
recognize some set of cultural performances, social practices, and institutions 
that constitute the system of social meanings of the racial or ethnic category. 
If the set of racially constitutive cultural performances, norms, meanings, 
social practices, or institutions were empty, then there would not be a salient 
category capable of producing discrimination. There certainly would be a 
group of people with certain physical traits (just like there is a group of 
people with bunions or freckles), but there would not be a complex of social 
meanings such that we could talk about groups being discriminated against 
in the thick sense. Again, someone could reject the constructivist theory of 
race and hold that it is a biological or genealogical fact. But such a view 
simply leaves the proponent no way to distinguish the thick meaning of 
discrimination—a morally problematic way of allocating benefits and 
burdens—from mere choosing based on idiosyncratic tastes or random 
meanness. 
We often lose sight of the practices and meanings that constitute the 
very categories of race because one of the properties of this social category 
is to appear as a natural fact about bodies instead of the effect of persistent 
social stratification and meaning-making.150 But the categories of 
WHITENESS or BLACKNESS are only available as a basis for perceiving and 
 
 149 In what sense, for example, would one say that “pink” is a facially gender-neutral criterion, 
especially if we are undertaking that analysis for purposes of asking if a state early-childhood-
development program only open to children that had never been dressed in pink discriminates on the basis 
of sex? I can only see that claim being defended from the premise that gender is a category that is 
constituted by genetic and biological facts. 
 150 That is, if one accepts the constructivist position on race that social practices constitute bodily 
signifiers as salient and meaningful, absent these there would be no such social category, or it would have 
a different content; “the visual salience of race comes less from any obvious physical differences and 
more from how social practices train individuals to look differently on certain bodies.” OBASOGIE, supra 
note 10, at 62. 
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acting upon in a discriminatory manner because of the system of social 
meanings and practices that bring about the very category; said another way, 
properties and structure do not exist independently of each other. 
Many theorists and commentators have argued in distinct fashions that 
antidiscrimination law ought to be a project of cultural reconstruction. For 
example, Robert Post has argued that antidiscrimination law should not be 
thought of as obliterating salient differences of race or sex, but changing the 
meanings; with respect to sex, Post urges an interpretation that “would not 
require us to imagine a world of sexless individuals, but would instead 
challenge us to explore the precise ways in which Title VII should alter the 
norms by which sex is given social meaning.”151 Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin 
have characterized the antisubordination tradition as “[t]he moral insistence 
that the low be raised up—that the forces of subordination be named, 
accused, disestablished, and dissolved—is our story, our civil rights 
tradition.”152 Andrew Koppelman proposes that what he terms the 
“antidiscrimination project” is necessarily an endeavor in which the state 
actively undertakes the goal of cultural transformation that “seeks to 
reconstruct social reality to eliminate or marginalize the shared meanings, 
practices, and institutions that unjustifiably single out certain groups of 
citizens for stigma and disadvantage.”153 
I concur with the content of those accounts in terms of a prescriptive 
vision for antidiscrimination law. However, the conceptual points that I have 
argued above have two important implications for antisubordination theory. 
First, in order to defend a position that the Equal Protection Clause ought to 
be understood as remedying group inequality, one needs a theory of what 
constitutes GROUPNESS in the relevant respects. Only with this in hand can 
we account for why we care about members of specific groups occupying 
disadvantaged positions in the social hierarchy above and beyond caring 
about the existence and shape of the hierarchy. Second, if one accepts the 
constructivist account of racial groups, then transformation of the 
constitutive meanings of the relevant groups is all antidiscrimination law 
 
 151 Post, supra note 30, at 17, 20 (“[A]ntidiscrimination law is itself a social practice, which regulates 
other social practices . . . . It is because the meaning of categories like race, gender, and beauty have 
become contested that we seek to use antidiscrimination law to reshape them in ways that reflect the 
purposes of the law.”). 
 152 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 47, at 17. Reva Siegel’s “sociohistorical” perspective on 
antidiscrimination law takes account of “preservation-through-transformation,” that is, how “[i]nequality 
in the distribution of material and dignitary goods among groups is periodically contested, and when the 
legitimacy of a particular distributive regime is successfully challenged, status-enforcing practices often 
evolve in rule structure and rationale . . . .” Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 
“Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83 
(2000).  
 153 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 8 (1996). 
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could coherently be about. Therefore, antisubordination can make a more 
forceful claim as the only sound interpretation of antidiscrimination norms 
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